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I. INTRODUCTION
This Term, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum.I The facts are controversial: a city seeks to decline an obscure
religion's request to display a monument of its "Seven Aphorisms," while
continuing to display other privately donated monuments, including a Ten
Commandments monument, originally donated by a local chapter of the
Fraternal Order of Eagles.2  At first, this situation appears disturbingly
reminiscent of the recent, extreme claim that the government may promote
biblical monotheism without violating the Establishment Clause.3  While
firmly rejecting that theory,4 this Article supports the city's government speech
argument on the Free Speech Clause claim, which is the only question
presented in the case.
5
When a municipality accepts and installs a donated monument in a public
park, that monument should be recognized as the government's own speech,
regardless of who originally conceived or funded the project. Under the
government speech doctrine, a government may promote its own viewpoint,
1. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665) (mem.).
2. Brief for Petitioners at i, 5-6 & n.2, Pleasant Grove, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (June 16, 2008)
(No. 07-665).
3. See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 889, 893
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to courtroom display of framed texts of the Ten
Commandments, "[w]ith respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear
from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout
atheists.").
4. An article by Professor Thomas Colby best summarizes the historical, doctrinal, and
normative flaws of Justice Scalia's purported originalist argument. See Thomas B. Colby, A
Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of
the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (2006). But see Kyle Duncan, Bringing
Scalia 's Decalogue Dissent Down from the Mountain, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 287, 288 ("[R]eading
Scalia's McCreary County dissent against the backdrop of his constitutional methodology shows
it is unlikely that he is engaging in 'monotheistic activism."'). See also infra note 231 and
accompanying text (acknowledging the risk that the incremental approach represented here may
desensitize courts and culture to additional large-scale changes in church-state relations).
5. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at i. This fine point did not deter the Justices
from extensive questioning of counsel on the Establishment Clause dilemma posed by a finding
of government speech. See infra notes 227, 235. For a discussion of the potential Establishment
Clause violation here, see infra Part V.B. 1.
[Vol. 58:7
Why Monuments are Government Speech
even by means of selecting among private speakers. 6 In an earlier article, I
argued that, with important limitations, the government speech analysis should
apply to public-private expressive partnerships, even where the government's
expressive purpose is broad and thematic, and the analysis is necessary to
avoid unwanted attribution that derails the government's intended message.
7
Monuments present a uniquely compelling context for this argument. The very
reason for their existence is to symbolize what a particular community, through
its elected representatives, has valued in terms of heroes, history, and culture;
that values message often is broad .
Based in part on information collected for the amicus curiae brief filed by
the International Municipal Lawyers Association (IMLA) in this case,9 this
Article shows that a city's display of donated monuments satisfies both current
judicial tests and many of the scholarly concerns regarding government
speech. 10  First, at the time it accepts the donation and afterward, the
government takes ownership of the message by exhibiting control over the
meaning conveyed by permanent monuments displayed in its parks. Second,
citizens both recognize the government as the speaker and hold it accountable.
And third, monuments have little or no negative impact, and arguably some
positive effect, on the private speech market. 1
Surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit held that because a city park is a public
forum, and the donated monument is located in a city park, Pleasant Grove
City created a public forum for monuments-thus, the court found, the city's
decision on Summum's offering is subject to strict scrutiny. 12 Predictably, the
city's rejection of the Seven Aphorisms-based on criteria of local historical
relevance and donors with long-standing ties to the community-failed this
6. E.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("[V]iewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government itself is the speaker
.... 1).
7. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 71, 73-75
(2004) (applying conclusions to streetlight pole banners, government-sponsored events and
corporate event sponsors, and municipal websites).
8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 10-11 (1998); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing the city's
monument policy, which requires "historical relevance or donation by a civic group with strong
community ties").
9. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Ass'n in Support of Petitioners
at apps. A-C, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (June 23, 2008) (No. 07-665)
[hereinafter IMLA Brief]. I was the counsel of record and sole author of the brief.
10. See infra Parts III.A.3, V.A.
11. Because the purpose of this Article is to add to the dialogue in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, which is currently before the Supreme Court, it does not strive to offer a
comprehensive theory of government speech. These three factors, however, represent a
threshold; further analysis of their universality and sufficiency is required.
12. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665).
2008]
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test.13  This holding equates monument installation with public assembly;
under the ruling, municipalities are left with a content-neutral, "first offered,
first displayed" standard that is inappropriate for symbolic structures. 14 The
more likely alternative is a limited public forum analysis, which allows some
content limitations, but prohibits selection based on the government's
viewpoint. 15 A municipality then would be barred from rejecting a monument
that portrayed its admired statesman as a thief or scoundrel if, at some location
in the park, he is memorialized as a noble leader.
Either approach strips municipal government of all ability to shape public
green space to reflect local tastes, values, and culture. 16 The impact has been
dramatized already by the notorious Fred Phelps in several cities within the
Tenth Circuit that had displayed the Eagles' Ten Commandments monuments
for decades. 17 Phelps proffered a so-called "monument" to Matthew Shepard,
a gay student who was beaten to death in a hate crime, which quotes the Bible
and proclaims that Shepard is now in hell because of his homosexuality. 18 To
avoid forced display of this hate symbol, which is required under the public
forum approach, Boise, Idaho, removed its donated Ten Commandments
Monument. 19  If the government speech doctrine is not applied in Pleasant
13. Id at 1047, 1052-55. The strict scrutiny test requires government to show that the
challenged rejection of the private speaker was the least restrictive means to serve a compelling
government interest. Id. at 1052 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
14. At oral argument, many Justices seemed troubled by the Summum's argument equating
permanent monuments with temporary assemblies. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 43,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2008) (statement of Scalia, J.) ("So
that's all right, the first 95 monuments, . . . - whoever put them up . . . whatever [kind of
monument], is that it?"); id. at 46 (statement of Kennedy, J.) ("[S]uppose we were to say that we
were unconvinced by the comparison between speeches and parades on the one hand and
monuments on the other .... ). See also infra Part IV.A.
15. See Summurn v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Judge Lucero's dissent).
16. This Article uses the terms "city" and "municipality" throughout, but its analysis applies
equally where the park land is owned by park districts and any other form of local government,
such as villages. Also, the Article's focus is on municipalities based on the case at issue; many, if
not all, of the points made here would apply to other levels of government.
17. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Cities of Casper, Wyoming et al., in Support of the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-5, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (Dec. 20,
2007) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter Casper Brief]; Chuck Oxlex, Boise Faces Phelps Controversy,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://www.religionnewsblog.com/5332/boise-
faces-phelps-controversy.
18. Casper Brief, supra note 17, at 2-3; Oxlex, supra note 17. The monument states:
"MATTHEW SHEPARD Entered Hell October 12, 1998, in Defiance of God's Warning 'thou
shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it is abomination. [sic]' Leviticus 18:22." Casper
Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
19. See Oxlex, supra note 17. The controversy began in response to a predecessor Tenth
Circuit decision, City of Ogden v. Summum, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002), discussed infra Part
I1I.B. Casper Brief, supra note 17, at 2. Casper City, Wyoming, responded to Phelps by moving
[Vol. 58:7
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Grove City v. Summum, the outcome will be the same for cities with donated
monuments celebrating gay rights or tolerance.
20
This is a highly significant First Amendment case because it is the first time
the Supreme Court will address the relatively new government speech doctrine
in a context that does not involve a government-funded program. To date, the
Court's decisions have involved either programs where the government
promotes a specific policy through private speakers,2' or government-financed
programs that necessarily involve discretionary decisions, such as funding the
22arts or state-owned broadcasting. A growing number of federal circuits,
however, have grappled with the proper analysis in more analogous contexts,
including the government's acknowledgement of sponsors and jointly
23produced, temporary outdoor art programs. These courts have developed a
four-factor test, which looks to the government's expressive purpose, editorial
control, role as literal speaker, and ultimate responsibility. 24 There has been
little concerted effort to analyze how these factors apply to donated
monuments, so this Article fills that gap.
25
its monument to a newly created "Historical Monument Plaza" in 2007, id., which does not
appear to be a viable option under the Pleasant Grove decision.
20. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
21. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553-57, 562, 564-67 (2005)
(finding that the government's promotion of beef consumption through advertisements funded by
beef-producers' tax was not unconstitutional compelled speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
177-78, 203 (1991) (allowing government's promotion of pro-life policy through selective
funding of family planning clinics). See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)
("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are
not speaking as private citizens for First Amendment purposes .... ); id. at 436-39 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as erroneously applying government speech
doctrine).
22. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998) (arts
funding); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (public
broadcasting).
23. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28-
31 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that elephant and donkey sidewalk sculptures were government
speech); Wells v. City of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1139-43 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding a sign listing
corporate sponsors of city holiday display was government speech).
24. See Gittens, 414 F.3d at 28, 30; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141.
25. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175-77 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297
F.3d 995, 1004-05 (10th Cir. 2002); see also infra Part 11.B (discussing the shortcomings of
Ogden's application of the four-factor test). Pleasant Grove's brief in the Supreme Court did not
address this now-standard test. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2 at 18-20 (summary of
argument).
Approaching the issue from different angles, one student note nicely analyzed the Tenth
Circuit decision, but it focused on forum analysis and lower court cases' treatment of permanent-
versus-temporary structures in public parks. See Keenan Lorenz, Survey, Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City: The Tenth Circuit "Binds the Hands of Local Governments as They Shape the
Permanent Character of Their Public Spaces", 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 646-48 (2008); see
also Paul E. McGreal, The Case for a Constitutional Easement Approach to Permanent
Catholic University Law Review
Another contribution of this Article is to disseminate the results of a
questionnaire distributed to members of IMLA to gather information on the
interactions between city governments, private citizens, and the monuments
displayed in local communities. 26  The resulting "Municipal Practice
Examples" (MPEs), while not a representative survey, provide a broad set of
examples and furnish a context for the Pleasant Grove case, including on the
three key issues that should control a government-speech case: government
content control, political accountability, and the impact on private speech.27
It is helpful to sketch current views on those three guideposts. First, the
Court's most recent statement on the new doctrine emphasized that where both
government and private speakers participate in the challenged expressions, to
sustain a claim of government speech, the government must control the
message.28  Second, political accountability is the essential rationale for
allowing government speech in the face of private speakers' claims of
exclusion, restriction, or compelled speech. 29  The Court has taken a
minimalist, structural stance on accountability, whereas most commentators
agree on the need for transparency-that is, at a minimum, citizens must be
aware that it is the government that is responsible for the challenged speech.3 °
The third critical concern is that government speech may dominate discourse,
crowding out or even silencing contrary private speech. Government speech is
defensible only when it operates as an additional voice to enhance a given
"marketplace of ideas. 31
As discussed below, the MPEs provide useful information on all three
points. First is the variety of methods by which municipalities control the
message; especially significant are requirements for legislative decisions on
specific content proposals and government's ongoing right of editorial
Monuments in Traditional Public Forums, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 185, 193-97 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/41/ (theorizing public speech rights
on government property in terms of easements). This new easement approach resolves the
permanent-temporary issue, but still leaves cities with the unsatisfactory "viewpoint-neutral"
scrutiny of their monument selections, that given to limited public forums. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part lI.B.
27. See infra Part II.B and Appendix (summarizing results).
28. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560, 562 (2005).
29. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
("When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or
contrary position.").
30. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49 (2000)
(discussing the problem of "ventriloquism").
31. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 610-11 & n.218
(1980) (advocating an "eclectic" approach for government speech in the "intellectual
marketplace"). The "marketplace of ideas," now a foundational metaphor in First Amendment
analysis, was coined by Justice Holmes. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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control. 32  Second is the citizens' demonstrated perception that their
government is responsible for the content of all monuments installed in their
city parks. 33 Third, not only does the location--city parks--ensure that private
speakers retain many alternatives, but the MPEs show that monuments may
stimulate additional private speech.34 Finally, application of the government
speech paradigm provides an additional policy benefit. In contrast to private
speakers in a public forum, the government is more likely to self-regulate by
appealing to the broad spectrum of its relevant community, and is subject to
constitutional limits on divisive and offensive speech. This includes, of
course, the Establishment Clause, as well as theorized potential limits, such as
on government speech based solely on animus. 35  Thus, allowing
municipalities to display donated monuments that reflect community values is
a well-grounded next step in developing the line between government speech
and forum analysis.
In Part II, this Article will lay out the background of Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum and explain the research methodology used to collect the MPEs. It
also will show the unique local culture expressed by donated monuments, as
well as the practical realities of expanding public-private partnerships. Part III
will make the case for why the evolving government speech paradigm should
govern here. Part IV will explain the deficiencies, in the monument context, of
both the Tenth Circuit's use of strict scrutiny and the alternative limited public
forum approach. Finally, Part V will explain why recognizing government
speech is good policy in this case, because it enhances community by limiting
divisive monuments, while preserving private speech opportunities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The Litigation
Pleasant Grove City is one of Utah's original Mormon settlements,
established by settlers sent from Salt Lake City by Brigham Young in 1850.
36
The City's "Pioneer Park," a 2.5-acre public park, was established in the 1940s
and contains some fifteen historical buildings and permanent artifacts, most of
them donated by private persons or groups.
32. See infra Part llI.B.2.
33. See infra Part l1I.B.4.
34. See infra Part V.A.
35. See infra Part V.B.
36. Pleasant Grove History, http://www.plgrove.org/ (follow "Unique to Pleasant Grove"
hyperlink; then follow "Pleasant Grove History" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (June 23, 2008) (No. 07-665). The displays include:
Old Bell School ([the] oldest known school building in Utah)
Pioneer Winter Corral (historic winter sheepfold)
2008]
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In 1971, the Pleasant Grove City Council voted to accept a Ten
Commandments monument from the local Fraternal Order of Eagles and
display it in Pioneer Park.3 s At the time, the local chapter had been established
in Pleasant Grove City for two years; it now has been an active philanthropy
there for nearly forty years. 39 As summarized in many cases, more than one-
hundred largely identical monoliths were distributed by the Eagles to state and
local governments over several decades. 40 The program was initiated by a
juvenile court judge and adopted by the organization, with a goal of reducing
juvenile delinquency by promulgating this moral code.4 1 Cecil B. DeMille,
who was then filming the movie The Ten Commandments, had a role in
producing and distributing the granite monoliths seen around the country.
42
Summum is a religious organization founded in 1975 and headquartered in
Salt Lake City, Utah, approximately thirty-five miles from Pleasant Grove.43
In September 2003, Summum sent a letter to "the mayor of Pleasant Grove
requesting permission to erect [in Pioneer Park] a monument [of its] Seven
Aphorisms," which "would be similar in size and [appearance] to the [Eagles']
Ten Commandments monument., 44 Although the letter did not explain their
content, the Summum organization states that the Seven Aphorisms
(psychokinesis, correspondence, vibration, opposition, rhythm, cause and
effect, and gender) 45 are its equivalent of the Ten Commandments, and were
revealed to the group's founder, known as Corky Ra, by other-worldly
beings.46
Nauvoo Temple Stone (artifact from Mormon Temple in Nauvoo, Illinois)
Pioneer Water Well (donated by [the] Lions Club in 1946)
Pioneer Granary (built in 1874, donated by Nelson family)
[The] Ten Commandments Monument (donated by Fraternal Order of Eagles in 197 1)
September 11 Monument (project of local Boy Scouts)
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Pleasant Grove, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 07-
665).
38. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665).
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 713 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Summum, 483 F.3d at 1047; see also About Summum, http://www.summum.us/about/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
44. Summum, 483 F.3d at 1047.
45. Seven Summum Principles, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008) (identifying the aphorisms alternatively as "principles").
46. See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, http://www.summum.us/
philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2008); Discourses with Summum
Bonem Amen Ra, The First Encounter, http://www.summum.us/insidethepyramid/?class=First
Encounter (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter First Encounter]; see also Patty Henetz, Utah-
Based Church Melds Wine, Sexuality, Meditation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 27, 2002, available
[Vol. 58:7
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The mayor of Pleasant Grove City sent Summum a letter in November 2003,
denying the request and stating that all permanent displays in Pioneer Park
either "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove or [must] be donated by
groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community. ' 47 In August
2004, the Pleasant Grove City Council passed a resolution that set forth a
detailed process for permanent placement of objects in the parks, codified the
criteria listed above, and further explained the factors the city council must
consider when deciding a proposed monument's historical relevance. 48  In
2005, Summum sent a second letter renewing its request. 49 After the city did
not respond, Summum filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the
city's exclusion of its monument, although allowing display of other
expressive permanent monuments, violated the Free Speech Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Free Expression and Establishment Clauses
of the Utah Constitution.50 The district court, ruling from the bench, denied
Summum's request for a preliminary injunction that would have required the
city to install Summum's proposed monument. 51 Summum appealed based
solely on the federal free speech claim.52
Several earlier Tenth Circuit Ten Commandments cases set the stage for the
circuit court's decision in Summum. In 1973, in Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., the court held that a municipality's prominent display of a Ten
Commandments monument, even in its courthouse entrance, did not violate the
Establishment Clause on the ground that such monuments convey a secular
message.53 Perhaps because of this precedent, when Summum challenged the
display of donated Ten Commandments monuments in other cities, the Tenth
at http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/042702/rel_0427020109.shtml (last visited Oct. 30,
2008) (noting that Summum founder Claude Nowell changed his name in the early 1980s "to
Summum Bonem Amen Ra and goes by Corky Ra"). Interestingly, the group claims that the
Seven Aphorisms first were given to Moses on Mount Sinai, but that the Israelites were unable to
understand them and so Moses then went back up to Mount Sinai and received the Ten
Commandments. The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments, supra. The
Summum believe that "summa individuals," who were not of this world, appeared to Mr. Ra in
his apartment and revealed the information on which he based the Summum philosophy. First
Encounter, supra. The group practices mummification of people and pets, and creates and
distributes wine to encourage meditation. Henetz, supra.
47. Summum, 483 F.2d at 1047 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at n.]
(noting that Summum claims it did not receive the letter, but its president learned of the denial
from a newspaper account).
48. Id. at 1047.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1048.
52. Id. at 1047-48.
53. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 30, 34 (10th Cir. 1973). Note that
Justice Breyer's controlling concurrence in the Van Orden decision characterized a similar Ten
Commandments monument donated by the Eagles as conveying a mixed message, including both
the religious and the secular. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
20081
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Circuit characterized the monuments as private speech and thus created a
forum for other private speakers.54 As analyzed below, in Summum v. City of
Ogden, the Tenth Circuit confronted the government speech argument directly,
applied the four-factor test, and held that the Ten Commandments monument
was the Eagles' speech, and not the city's. 55 In the Tenth Circuit decision now
before the Court, the possible application of the government speech paradigm
was dismissed in a footnote.
56
In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, the Tenth Circuit took an unusual, and
erroneous, approach to forum analysis. It reasoned that because city parks are
traditional public forums, any content-based restrictions on private speech in
Pioneer Park-including private speech in the form of installing a permanent
monument-are subject to strict scrutiny. 57 The court then held that the city's
interest in promoting its history was not compelling, and that its historical
relevance criterion was unrelated to its stated interests in aesthetics, preserving
park space, and reducing safety hazards. 58 Because the Summum "monument
is similar in size, material, and appearance to the Ten Commandments
monument already displayed," the court issued a preliminary injunction
ordering the city to permit the display of Summum's monument.59
There were two opinions dissenting from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc. First, Judge Lucero correctly observed that forumanalysis focuses on the specific type of access sought, and there is no
54. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
permanent monuments, on the land of a municipal building, were a nonpublic forum); Summum
v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 & n.14, 919 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the courthouse lawn
was nonpublic forum).
55. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
56. See Summum, 483 F.3d at 1052 n.4.
57. Id. at 1050-52.
58. See id. at 1054.
59. Id. at 1055, 1057.
60. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane); id. at 1174 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). In their opinions, Judges Lucero and McConnell also dissented from the denial of the
rehearing en bane ofSummum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007), where a city had
attempted to transfer to a private party a small plot of land within a public park, on which a
challenged Ten Commandments monument stood, and Summum had sued to obtain a similar
parcel for its own monument. Id. at 1266. In Duchesne, the Tenth Circuit remanded for a
decision on whether the city's transfer complied with state law, noting that even if it did,
Summum might have a First Amendment right to display its monument in the park while the Ten
Commandments stood. Id. at 1275. The city of Duchesne filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court on November 21, 2007. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Duchesne City v.
Summum, No. 07-690 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/
DuchesneCityvSummumPetition forWrit of Certiorari_1212007.pdf. The ACLJ, also
counsel of record for Pleasant Grove, asked the Supreme Court to hold its decision on Duchesne
until its decision on the Pleasant Grove case. Reply to Brief in Opposition at 7, Duchesne, No.
07-690 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/ACLJ Duchesne-Reply-
to-Brief-in-Opposition_030708.pdf.
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traditional public forum right to the installation of permanent monuments. 6 1
He stated that the city created a limited public forum when it allowed several
donated monuments to be erected for the purpose of historic preservation, and
he would have granted a rehearing to consider the suggested impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. 62  Judge McConnell, joined by Judge Gorsuch,
argued that once a city accepts a donated monument and displays it on public
63land, the monument is government speech. No forum was created because
the city did not "invite Xprivate citizens to erect monuments of their own
choosing in the[] park[]." Summarily applying the circuit court's four-factor
test, Judge McConnell found the test satisfied based on the city's ownership of
the structure, which signaled its adoption of the message. Finally, Chief
Judge Tacha, author of the Tenth Circuit's original opinion, took the unusual
step of issuing a response to Judge McConnell's dissent. 66 She argued that the
monuments could not be government speech because the city did not exercise
any control over the content of the monuments' messages and, further, to
extend the doctrine in this case "would allow the government to discriminate
among private speakers in a public forum by claiming a preferred message as
its own." 67
B. The Municipal Practice Examples (MPEs): Research Methodology
The original purpose of the IMLA questionnaire was simply to provide the
Court with a set of examples that was more comprehensive than the handful of
anecdotes and hypotheticals presented in the briefs filed at the petition for
certiorari stage. My goal was to collect information from a broad range of
municipalities of various sizes, from all areas of the country, 69 on monuments
61. Pleasant Grove, 499 F.3d at 1172-73 (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (quoting Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1993) ("There is no private
constitutional right to erect a structure on public property.")) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (narrowing the relevant forum to an internal mail
system, not a school building)).
62. Id. at 1174.
63. Id. at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1176-77.
66. Id. at 1178 (Tacha, C.J., responding to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
67. Id. at 1182..
68. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 37, at 27-29; Brief Amici Curiae of
the American Legion et al. in Support of Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2007) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter Brief of the
American Legion].
69. The Applicable Responses included 34 different states representing all regions of the
United States. There were 71 cities with populations fewer than 100,000, 30 cities with
populations from 100,000 to fewer than one million, 15 Applicable Responses not identifying any
city, and only one city with more than one-million residents.
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that fit the case criteria-privately donated, permanent structures that a city
government had agreed to display in a municipal public park.7°
The questionnaire's objectives were provided by the growing body of case
law and commentary on the relatively new doctrine of government speech. 71
There were several, intertwined areas of interest: (1) the selection-decision
process, including any established criteria and evidence of government content
control or editing; (2) the government's ownership and control of the physical
object; (3) any involvement of the political process, including the identity of
the decision-makers and evidence of citizen participation or opposition; and (4)
the impact on private speech, if such monuments are characterized as
government speech. A review of the literature did not identify any reported
similar questionnaires.
Based on these objectives, I drafted a list of questions for a convenience
sample of IMLA's members-attomeys who represent one or more
municipalities, either as government employees or outside counsel. The tool
used was a self-administered, computer-assisted questionnaire, distributed by
IMLA through the website SurveyMonkey.com. 73  The respondents were
informed by IMLA that the purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain
information that would be used in IMLA's amicus brief in Pleasant Grove.
74
The questions were "closed," providing multiple-choice answers, with an
"open" feature (labeled "please describe"), which also solicited narrative
descriptions from the respondents. The questions were pre-tested for clarity
and content-validity by four experienced municipal attorneys and one social
scientist.
The MPEs discussed in this Article are offered only as a broad set of
examples. I make no claim that the responses are representative of all
municipalities in the United States. The response rate was slightly less than
20%, perhaps because of the short time-frame available for submitting an
70. The term "monument" was broadly defined in the IMLA questionnaire to mean "a
permanent fixed structure that must be erected or installed, and which conveys or tends to convey
some communicative message." IMLA Brief, supra note 9, app. B, at 5a. Examples were given
of various types of monuments, including "memorials" and "public art." See Appendix.
71. See cases cited infra at note 122, and commentary cited infra notes 135, 140, and 168.
72. IMLA Brief, supra note 9, app. A, at la.
73. Id. IMLA sent an e-mail to its approximately 2500 members, which requested that they
follow a hyperlink to the "survey monkey" page and complete the questions. Id. For a complete
copy of the questionnaire administered, please see id. app. B. The text in the member e-mail was
the same as the text in the "Instructions and Purposes" section of the questionnaire. Id. app. A, at
Ia.
74. Id. app. B, at 4a. All questionnaire responses included in this Article were previously
made public in the amicus brief. See id. apps. C & D. Also, Question Number 1, which asked
respondent's name, position, e-mail, municipality represented and its population, was optional, id.
app. B, at 5a; a handful of respondents chose to provide information anonymously, see id app. D,
at 25a-26a. Most, if not all, information provided by respondents also would be publicly
available, though not easily accessible, through other sources.
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amicus brief. All responses were read and screened to eliminate non-
responsive, non-applicable, or duplicate responses, as explained further
below.75  Thus, the set of Applicable Responses used for analysis and
summarized in the Appendix is smaller than the original response rate. In
addition, the respondents' presumed alliance with Pleasant Grove City raises
the issue of bias, but it appears that the responses were free of significant bias.
This conclusion is based on the non-self-serving nature of many of the
responses given, and on the unclear state of the law (for example, a survey
respondent could not always predict what would be the "right" answer to
support Pleasant Grove's position).76
75. As explained in the IMLA brief:
Between April 24th and May 15th, 2008, IMLA received a total of 238 responses
.... [T]he original deadline, based on the original amicus brief due date, was April
30th, and the bulk of the responses were received within that initial time frame.... Of
the 238 total responses, 117 were deemed responsive and used for examples and
analysis in these Appendixes and the brief.
Of the 238 total responses, 88 gave no response to the substantive questions, but
only completed all or part of the optional first question, which requested name,
municipality, and contact information. Counsel of Record's assistant sent a follow-up
email to these non-respondents (N/R), asking which of a list of potential reasons for not
completing any of Questions Nos. 2-16 applied to them. Of the 20 who replied, 16
reported that the municipalities they represent do not display privately-donated
monuments, 2 did not have the requested information, I had technical difficulties, and 1
was filing a brief in the case.
Id. app. A, at 2a.
With respect to "non-respondents" and the "applicable responses" that failed to respond on
particular questions, no attempt was made to impute data by estimating how respondents would
have answered particular questions if they had chosen to do so.
In addition, of the 238 total responses, 16 responses were excluded from IMLA's
legal analysis for this brief because they were not relevant enough to the legal questions
presented in this case (N/A). Three [of the excluded responses] represented
municipalities in Canada, and 13 [others] provided responses related to speech
activities other than privately-donated, permanent monuments in parks (e.g., temporary
banners or murals on a government building). Substantive responses [(i.e., responses
that were not N/R)] were excluded from the set of "117 Applicable Responses"
(summarized in [the Appendix]) solely because of the reasons stated in this paragraph.
Finally, of the 238 total responses, 16 were duplicates, i.e., they self-identified as
representing municipalities for which there were one or more other responses. Note
that most of those were N/R, but they were counted in this separate category. Some of
them contained additional narrative information. In those cases, all narrative
information was used, but only one set of multiple-choice answers was counted per
municipality. There were no identified inconsistencies.
Id. app. A, at 2a-3a.
76. Examples of responses against perceived interests include a number of narrative
responses indicating that their municipalities did not, but should, have a written policy, and
stories of lawsuits and potential legal exposure. E.g., SurveyMonkey.com Survey Results
Generated for Mary Jean Dolan, No. 229 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter Survey Results] (on file
with the Catholic University Law Review) (Boise, Idaho) (commenting on litigation regarding
Boise's Ten Commandments monument removal, enjoinment of removal, and public
referendum). Also, some of the "non-applicable" responses, described supra note 75 (for
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The information collected was analyzed and is presented here. The
multiple-choice responses are presented in the Appendix as tallies (that is, a list
of the number of applicable responses for each provided choice).77 Analysis of
the narrative responses was done two ways. First, SurveyMonkey.com
automatically generated a list of all narrative responses for each numbered
question (without identifying which answer was from which respondent).
78
Second, each applicable respondent's answer to each numbered question was
summarized in an Excel spreadsheet.79 Selected narrative responses were used
in the Article to provide more detailed stories of the experience of some
municipalities.
80
example, government building murals and memorial brick programs), appear to reflect an
incorrect assumption that those contexts are legally indistinguishable from the donated
monuments context. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. That the lines between
government speech and forum analysis remain unclear, generally, is shown by this case, as well
as by the rash of specialty license plate cases. See infra note 146. Finally, most respondents
appeared to be general municipal law practitioners, rather than First Amendment or appellate
specialists. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra, No. 197 (Boulder County, Colo.) ("Boulder County
Attorney"); id. No. 32 (Moorehead, Minn.) ("City Attorney"); id. No. 26 (Neenah, Wis.) ("City
Attorney/HR Director"); id. No. 28 (Sheboygan, Wis.) ("City Attorney"); id. No. 27 (Wheeling,
W. Va.) ("City Solicitor").
77. See Appendix. The only analysis of an independent variable, population of
municipality, did not show any observable differences between municipalities with populations
fewer than and more than 100,000 people. See Survey Results, supra note 76, Nos. 67, 79, 117,
162, 197, 228, 229, 232, 235. Only two municipalities with populations of more than one million
responded. Id. No. 129 (San Antonio, Tex.); id. No. 158 (Phoenix, Ariz.). Based on
conversations with attorneys for three large cities, it appears that gathering information for
responses was more burdensome for large cities, which are more likely to involve a larger number
of persons in various departments. Telephone Interview with Benna Solomon, Deputy
Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago Law Department (Apr. 28, 2008); Telephone Interview
with Elise Bruhl, Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of Philadelphia Law Department (May 15,
2008); Telephone Interview with Barbara Rosenberg, Appellate Coordinator, Dallas City
Attorney Office (May 28, 2008).
78. See Analysis Features, SurveyMonkey.com, http://www.surveymonkey.com/Home_
FeaturesDesign.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
79. See id. The process of creating, administering, compiling and analyzing the
questionnaires followed guidance provided in ARLENE FrNK, THE SURVEY HANDBOOK (2d ed.
2003). Guidance on the use of qualitative surveys and convenience sampling for legal analysis
was taken from, among other sources, Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to
Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense
Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 436-42 (2004), and
Richard Lempert, Empirical Research for Public Policy: With Examples from Family Law and
Advice on Securing Funding 15-23 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 95, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1000700.
80. The complete results of the questionnaire are maintained at the author's offices, and
additional copies of the responses cited in the Article are on file with the Catholic University Law
Review. The results include: (1) the full set of responses (two to three pages from each of the 238
respondents, including the non-respondents, non-applicable responses, and duplicate responses,
automatically generated by SurveyMonkey.com); (2) SurveyMonkey.com-automatically-
generated summaries of all narrative answers listed by question number (neither listed nor cross-
referenced by respondent number); (3) a SurveyMonkey.com-automatically-generated report
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The usefulness of the MPEs is enhanced by triangulation. Triangulation is
the use of multiple data sources to help control for inaccurate reporting by
checking responses for general consistency with information from reliable
outside sources. 81 Given the absence of quantitative studies on these questions,
the outside sources used here are additional examples and persons with
relevant experiential knowledge. These include: (1) news articles on
monuments, including those discussed in this Article; (2) scholarly books and
articles that are based on first-person observations of a wide variety of
monuments and related stories; (3) telephone interviews with high-level
attorneys with personal knowledge who represent Portland, Oregon,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Chicago, Illinois, and IMLA; and (4) ethnographic
observations 82 based on my personal experiences as a municipal attorney
specializing in the First Amendment.
C. Unique Local Culture and the Indivisibility of Public-Private Monuments
Monuments in city parks communicate messages about particular
communities, regardless of their public, private, or joint origin. Because this
valuable green space is owned and maintained by government entities where
monuments reside-whether war memorials, testaments to bygone leaders,
commemorations of current heroes or issues, or large abstract sculptures-it is
understood by the public that the government has agreed to their installation.
83
One noted scholar, Sanford Levinson, observed that, frequently, private
summarizing all 238 responses, using percentages and bar graphs (not presented in the Appendix,
because those numbers are misleading in that they included the non-applicable and duplicate
responses); (4) an Excel spreadsheet compiled by the author's assistant, which lists all responses
to each question for the " 117 Applicable Responses" in a user-friendly presentation; (5) a list
identifying the non-respondents, and the reasons given by them, if any; (6) a list identifying the
non-applicable responses and the reasons given; and (7) a list of duplicate responses.
81. See Etienne, supra note 79, at 441-42. For an example of that triangulation, see the
integration of MPE examples and news reports illustrating the indivisibility of the public-private
roles in monuments, as set forth in Part II.C.
82. Ethnography, a paradigm that originated in anthropology but has been used recently in
other fields, including law, involves interacting with and observing research subjects. Etienne,
supra note 79, at 442 n.58 (citing Barbara Tedlock, Ethnography and Ethnographic
Representation, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 470 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna
S. Lincoln eds., 2d ed. 2000)). In her study, Etienne relied on personal experience as a criminal
defense attorney to contextualize her interview results. Id. at 442-43.
I spent more than ten years as a special legal counsel to the City of Chicago, advising and
writing laws and policies on projects that could be analyzed under government speech or public
forum doctrines, including donated monuments and public art. Etienne notes that legal
practitioner experience could be viewed as a potential source of bias, but "[b]ias ... is not a flaw
in ethnography, which is based largely on participation and immersion into the culture or group
being studied." Id. at 443 n.61 (citing ROBERT M. EMERSON ET AL., WRITING ETHNOGRAPHIC
FIELDNOTES 2 (1995)).
83. See infra note 138.
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persons donate monuments for the purpose of obtaining "the state's special
imprimatur for the message contained within the monument."
84
The MPEs illustrate both the uniquely local character of many privately
donated monuments, and the indivisibility of the public and private roles.
Some statues reflect a type of individual admired by the community, whether a
union organizer or captain of industry. 85 Others document a particular slice or
version of local history; these may include, for example, both local Native
Americans and the adventuring gold miners who took over their territory.
86
And some monument decisions express specific, locally influenced means of
honoring our nation's conflicts, such as the Hmong-American Vietnam War
Memorial displayed in Sheboygan, Wisconsin.
87
The Tenth Circuit's fundamental error was drawing a sharp-and artificial-
distinction between "private" and "public" monuments. 88 As the MPEs and
other examples show, that is not how municipalities operate. Instead, the two
sectors often blend roles in a seamless partnership. Under the Tenth Circuit's
approach, if a city commissions and pays for a statue, that may be government
speech, but the same statue donated through a private organization's initiative
is private speech.89
Narrative responses from the MPEs tell a different story. "Often the projects
... result from informal discussions among [the] leaders of the community and
representatives of the City. It is often hard to determine who made the 'first
move."' 90 And, "[w]e make every effort to work with community groups who
propose appropriate fountains, artwork, or other similar items. We almost
never are made a 'take it or leave it' offer . . . .91 Similarly, in one
municipality that has "accepted [private] money to construct memorials for the
84. See LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 90 (noting that "it is not at all unusual for private
individuals or groups to finance monuments," such as many found throughout New York City's
Central Park).
85. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 27 (Wheeling, W. Va.) (Walter Reuther,
international labor organizer, born in the city); id. No. 10 (Anonymous) (John A. Roebling,
founder of Roebling Steel, formerly the town's main business). See also id. No. 139 (Olney, I11.)
(Robert Ridgway, author, artist, scientist, founder of Bird Haven).
86. Id. No. 197 (Boulder, Colo.) (describing local monuments to both local Native
American Chief Niwot and mining history statue). See also id No. 115 (Benicia, Cal.) (Pony
Express monument); id. No. 188 (Spanish Fork, Utah) (statue of Fathers Dominguez and
Escalante, first European explorers of area, and monument to city's large Icelandic population);
id. No. 198 (Hartford, Conn.) (Hartford Circus Fire memorial).
87. See id. No. 28 (Sheboygan, Wis.). See also, e.g., id No. 78 (Fredericksburg, Tex.)
(monuments to local war heroes); id. No. 211 (Fayetteville, Ark.) (large bronze statue displaying
the word "peace" in many world languages).
88. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665).
89. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007) (Tacha, C.J.,
response to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
90. Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 117 (Kansas City, Mo.).
91. Id.
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soldiers in Iraq, Korea, and Vietnam" and statues of the city's founders, the
respondent commented that "there has been a [cooperative] effort between the
Mayor's office and private citizen groups. ' 9 Indeed, private funds and citizen
initiatives are the. force behind many of the nation's significant monuments,
including such icons as the Iwo Jima Monument in Arlington, Virginia, and the
Vietnam Veteran's Memorial in Washington, D.C.
9 3
Two publicized examples of specific donations give more detail. First, even
commissioned public monuments often are funded through private donations,
and large benefactors participate in selecting the content and creator of the
monuments. For example, the City of Chicago's unique Crown Fountain,
opened in 2004 in the new Millennium Park, was funded by the Crown
family.94 Following an invited competition, the private patron, city officials,
and a public-private planning committee together selected its creator, Spanish
sculptor Jaume Plensa, a leading contemporary artist.95 The new landmark
consists of two fifty-foot-high towers that display changing video images of
photographed faces, bookending a water-filled area used for play and
96interaction. The donors and city personnel worked together over several
years on the implementation details, including previewing a mock-up of the
structure and providing input and limitations on the content displayed.
Second, when a private donor presents an existing monument as a proposed
gift to a municipality, its display on public land requires a governmental
decision and, often, the use of public funds. For example, in Lake Geneva,
Wisconsin, a resort town close to Chicago, philanthropist Richard Driehaus
donated a grand neoclassical fountain, a replica of one installed in New York's
Central Park in 1873.98 Originally purchased for his own estate, Mr. Driehaus
offered the fountain as a town centerpiece, stating that it celebrates Lake
Geneva's illustrious past and historic lake front estates. The city council
92. Id. No. 60 (Cedar City, Utah).
93. Brief of the American Legion, supra note 68, at 1 n.12 (documenting the private
donations and donors for listed monuments).
94. TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, MILLENNIUM PARK: CREATING A CHICAGO LANDMARK 278,
291 (2006).
95. See id. at 280.
96. Id at 277.
97. See id at 279-80, 286-87, 290-91; Millennium Park History, http://www.
millenniumpark.org/parkhistory/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). This information regarding
implementation was confirmed by telephone interview with Ed Uhlir, Project Director,
Millennium Park on June 17, 2008.
98. See Fund-raiser Will Help Enhance Area, LAKE GENEVA REGIONAL NEWS, June
24, 2004, http://www.lakegenevanews.net/Articles-i-2004-06-24-89458. 112112_Fundraiser will
helpenhancearea.html.
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approved acceptance of the gift and committed $40,000 for its installation in a
central location.
99
These counterpoints also show how monuments convey thematic
government messages, even where the donations are public art, rather than text
or an historical figure. The Crown Fountain successfully sends its intended
message: Chicago is cutting-edge, a world-class city, a leader in the arts. The
Driehaus Fountain, by contrast, expresses a quieter message of privilege and
embracing history. If Lake Geneva had been offered a large contemporary
monument to anchor the traditional town, or if the Crown family had proposed
a Gilded Age monument for Chicago's Millennium Park, such donations likely
would have been declined as inconsistent with the municipalities' identities.
With this broader background, which shows the interplay between public and
private sectors and how the local culture is conveyed through park monuments,
the next step is analyzing how the tests for, and concerns about, government
speech apply in this context.
III. WHY MUNICIPAL DISPLAY OF DONATED MONUMENTS is GOVERNMENT
SPEECH
The government's role as the creator of beautiful and welcoming public
parks makes a better case for government speech than many of those
previously recognized by the Supreme Court. Government decisions about
monuments synthesize the two lines of cases-municipalities both edit the
communal landscape and convey broad local identity messages-and better
satisfy the political accountability rationale. Further, application of the lower
courts' four-factor test explains the government's role as speaker, and the
acknowledgement of that role by its citizens.
A. Valid Principles Derived from Supreme Court Precedent
1. Inherently Discretionary Speech Selection
Some of the Court's government speech opinions involve a government role
that necessarily involves discretion and is thus imbued with viewpoint, rather
than the promotion of a specific, substantive government policy. National
Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, which involved a federal funding program for
the arts, upheld allowing the NEA to consider decency, diversity, and
American values, where its decisions based on artistic merit were already
"inherently content-based."' 100  In Arkansas Educational Television
99. See id. For additional examples of similar partnerships between the public and private
sectors with respect to monuments, see infra note 11l (regarding recent Arthur Ashe and Lincoln
monuments in Richmond, Virginia).
100. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73, 586 (1998). The
statutory amendment, passed in reaction to funding of art described as homoerotic and
sacrilegious, id. at 572, 574-75, counseled, but did not mandate, "taking into consideration
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Commission v. Forbes, the Court observed that the role of the public television
broadcaster necessarily requires allowing editorial discretion, including
discretion in its selection of which viewpoints and private speakers to include
in its programming.
1°1
The Tenth Circuit interpreted these cases narrowly when it rejected a role for
discretion in monument decisions because the city was not acting as a
"librarian, television broadcaster, or arts patron."102  Similar to Forbes,
agreeing to install a monument means allocating a portion of a limited public
good-there, air time; here, open space-to a particular piece of originally
private speech. When exercising their park-management function,
municipalities balance many interests, including editing the landscape with an
eye toward creating beauty and maximizing public enjoyment, while remaining
consistent with the town's character. Where municipalities do have policies to
guide decisions on proposed donations of monuments for parks, many
recognize the importance of preserving open space in making 
these choices,
which supports the editing analogy. Like in Finley, monuments are a form of
public art; they include representative statues, textual messages, and abstract
sculptures with potent images.
At the same time, decisions on installing monuments are distinguishable
because they occur sporadically. Because this form of speech is more inspired
and unpredictable, it is typically outside the scope of an official government
program with established criteria, such as the criteria in Finley.' Moreover,
in contrast to the regular television programming role in Forbes,10 5 decisions
regarding monuments are more of an occasional job for most city-government
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public," id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669, 674 (1998) (holding that
televised candidate debates are a narrow exception to this discretion, but that an objective lack of
support was a reasonable content limitation for that nonpublic forum).
102. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1052 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665); see also id (citing United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003)) (noting that "public library staffs have broad discretion to
consider content in making collection decisions").
103. See, e.g., Portland, Or., Admin. R. ARB-PRK-3.01 (Sept. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.portlandonline.com/Auditor/index.cfm?a=68087&c=36767 (including in the policy
objectives for accepting gifts and memorials, that gifts are "expected to enhance a park without
hindering the quality of the open space"). Note that it appears that many municipalities do not
have written policies. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 10 (Anonymous) (no written
criteria); No. 26 (Neenah, Wis.) (no criteria); No. 28 (Sheboygan, Wis.) (no criteria); No. 54
(Kalispell, Mont.) (no indication of written criteria); No. 228 (Charlotte, N.C.) (noting "only
content review," but no written criteria indicated).
104. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 573.
105. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673.
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bodies or departments. 10 6  Therefore it is useful to look at how monument
decisions blend inherent subjectivity with expressive messages, which are
sometimes specific but often thematic.
2. Communities' Broad Identity Messages
Because all monuments convey ideas and values, whether stated explicitly or
in broad themes,' a decision on monument display also fits, wholly or
partially, into the other line of Supreme Court government speech cases: where
the government promotes a substantive policy message through private
speakers.1 8 The MPEs illustrate how governments' decisions regarding whose
lives to honor in this way, and how they should be portrayed, express an
administration's view of community ideals at the time of installation.'
0 9
Controversial monuments, especially, convey distinct political and
philosophical messages. Examples include a Tucson, Arizona, statue of
Pancho Villa, a Mexican revolutionary leader,1 10 and a recently installed large-
scale monument of Abraham Lincoln, which the Richmond, Virginia, city
council voted to help finance in the face of substantial protests from some
quarters. I1  The expressive symbolic power of monuments also is highlighted
106. Cf Brief Amicus Curiae of the City of New York in Support of Petitioners at 5-7,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 127 S. Ct. 1737 (June 23, 2008) (discussing New York City's
atypical ongoing public-art and monument program).
107. For a thorough treatise on government's policy expressions through war monuments,
see JAMES M. MAYO, WAR MEMORIALS AS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE AND BEYOND 1-13 (1988) (discussing symbolic messages from the perspective of
an architecture and urban design professor). See also Nicolas Howe, Thou Shalt Not
Misinterpret: Landscape as Legal Performance, 98 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N OF AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 435, 437 (2008) ("Monuments... are the most obvious and ubiquitous means by
which the nation-state signifies itself in the landscape. By arousing feelings of metaphysical
belonging and focusing them on a symbol of historical and geographic subjectivity, they give
concrete form to collective memory." (citation omitted)). Cf Randall P. Bezanson, Art and the
Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1596-97, 1601 (2008) (submitting that "nonpropositional"
art should be protected by the First Amendment as art, not as speech, and describing such art as
coming from a "sensual response ... an act of newly imagined meaning" by each individual
viewer, as opposed to speech, in which the speaker intends, and the audience understands, a
cognitive message). I suggest that abstract art, where it is publicly owned and displayed, carries
an intended broad identity message.
108. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562-65 (2005) (promoting
beef consumption through advertisements funded by tax on beef producers was not
unconstitutionally compelled speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1991) (allowing
the promotion of pro-life policy through selective funding of family planning clinics).
109. See supra Part II.C.
110. See Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 235 (Tucson, Ariz.) (responding that display of a
donated statue of Pancho Villa, a Mexican revolutionary leader who advocated for agrarian
reform and the poor, has prompted opposition by some who view the figure as an "outlaw" rather
than a "hero").
11. See Jeremy Redmon & Lindsay Kastner, Lincoln Statue Unveiled, TIMES-DISPATCH
(Richmond, Va.), Apr. 6, 2003, at B I. There were extensive protests surrounding a new Abraham
Lincoln monument, which was initiated by the U.S. Historical Society, a Richmond-based
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when the public's perception of a given monument changes along with cultural
112
mores.
Each decision matters because the installation and placement of a new
monument can transform a values message sent by previously existing
displays. A striking, positive example of this occurred in 1996, when a large
bronze sculpture of tennis great Arthur Ashe joined the existing statues of five
Confederate leaders on Richmond's well-known "Monument Avenue."
1 3
After several years of debate over this proposed location, 114 which
incorporated the longstanding debate over the meaning of Confederate
symbols, 5 the final, democratic decision was that this location for a memorial
to this modem-day Richmond hero sent a welcome message of change and
opportunity.
116
The Court's most recent pronouncement on government speech, Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, provides the most comprehensive guidance for
determining when the government is speaking, rather than private persons,
when both are involved. 17 In Johanns, the respondent beef producers argued
that tax-funded television ads ("Beef. It's What's For Dinner") were not
government speech because their content was controlled by a nongovernmental
entity, half comprised of cattle producers appointed by the Secretary of
Agriculture, and the other half of industry members. 118 Despite a large
organization. Id. The Richmond City Council passed a resolution calling the statue a "symbol of
unity and reconciliation" and approved a public contribution of up to $45,000 toward the granite
plaza at its location on nearby federal park land. Id.
112. See, e.g., Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 92 (Longview, Wash.) (noting that some
now question the accuracy of a statue's portrayal of Sacajawea, the Shoshone woman who was a
guide for Lewis and Clark). See also infra Part II.B.2 (regarding the ongoing fight to edit a
message over time when citizens start to object).
113. J. Michael Martinez & Robert M. Harris, Graves, Worms, and Epitaphs: Confederate
Monuments in the Southern Landscape, in CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SOUTH 130, 170-72 (J. Michael Martinez et al. eds., 2000).
114. Race-Tinged Furor Stalls Arthur Ashe Memorial, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, at 20.
115. See, e.g., CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH (J. Michael
Martinez et al. eds., 2000) (collecting multi-disciplinary essays against preserving symbols of
racial oppression and for preserving Southern history).
116. Cf LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 116-19, 127-28 (concluding, after considering
numerous possible responses to historical monument speech that has become offensive, that the
best response is government counter-speech-for example, display of monuments honoring
successful African American citizens). Note as well that a private organization, the "Virginia
Heroes," originated the proposal for the Ashe monument and presented the project to Richmond's
City Council. See The Arthur Ashe Monument, http://www.cvco.org/arts/psculpt/ashe (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008).
117. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 (2005). Johanns was a
compelled-subsidy case, rather than a forum dispute, and involved a government program with a
specific policy message. Id. at 553-54. See also Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
964-65 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting distinctions but applying the appellate courts' four-factor test and
Johanns after observing that both tests are directed at the same issues).
118. Johanns. 544 U.S. at 554. 560.
Catholic University Law Review
creative role by private citizens, the majority found government speech
because: "The message of the promotional campaigns is effectively controlled
by the Federal Government itself."'119 There were two critical features. First,
"the government sets the overall message to be communicated,"'' 20 based on a
statutory federal policy of promoting beef consumption. 12  Second, the
Secretary had final approval for all advertisements, as demonstrated by: (1)
prior review of ad copy by Department officials; (2) rejection or rewriting of
some proposals by the Department; and (3) participation by Department
personnel in open meetings at which proposals were developed.
1 ' 2
The MPEs show that municipalities around the country exercise content
control over monuments through procedures that are remarkably similar to
those outlined in Johanns. First, although adopted less frequently because of
the occasional nature of monument donation, some cities have applicable
written policies setting criteria for donations of public art, park improvements,
or monuments.123 Second, many municipalities require submission of words
and graphics before any government decision is made to accept a monument,
and many require design input. 124  Third, some questionnaire respondents
provided specific examples of times when a city required modification of
words or images prior to display.'
25
Fourth, and perhaps most significant, the vast majority of municipalities in
the MPEs require legislative acceptance of any privately donated monument.'
26
Thus, for these municipalities, open meetings are required and the specifics of
the proposed monument are discussed publicly before approval by elected
representatives. 27 Given that the type of monument at issue usually conveys
its symbolic content effectively-for example, a monument to the Hmong role
119. Id. at 560.
120. Id. at 562.
121. Id. at 553 (citing Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99
Stat. 1597 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2901(b))).
122. Id. at 561.
123. E.g., Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 162 (St. Petersburg, Fla.) (new ordinance
requires legislative consideration and approval of historic significance of any proposed
monument).
124. E.g., id. No. 79 (Newport News, Va.) (written policy regarding proposed monuments for
military-related actions requires city review and approval of text detailing actions of honorees
prior to approval of monument).
125. E.g., id. No. 232 (Tucson, Ariz.) ("[The] wording is sometimes modified to be sensitive
to a large audience[.] In the case of a monument (The Morman [sic] Battalion), [the] artist was
asked to reconsider physical traits that appeared to lack sensitivity to a diverse population.").
126. See Appendix (citing 93-of the 117-applicable responses that stated their municipal
client required legislative acceptance of all monuments prior to installation).
127. Municipal legislative bodies generally are required by state law to deliberate and vote in
meetings open to the public, and to vote only on agenda items of which the public has been given
advance notice. See, e.g., Open Meetings Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2008).
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in the Vietnam War, or to local Chief Niwot 28-legislative approval is, in
almost all cases, the practical equivalent of a requirement for prior submission
and approval of each monument's dominant message. Even where the MPE
responses did not provide any narrative response describing the monuments
displayed, it is highly unlikely that any city council would vote to approve a
generic "monument." Thus, in almost all cases where legislative approval is
required, it is reasonable to assume content control by the representative
government.
Johanns, of course, is distinguishable from many municipal monument
decisions. In one sense, but for the attribution issue discussed in the next
section, Johanns is a classic case of defensible government speech. Through
the legislative process, the government set a clear policy-to help the industry
by promoting beef consumption-and implemented that policy with the. . .. . . 129 ..
participation of private citizens. The policy in Johanns is not much different
from the unobjectionable case where a government administration seeks citizen
input on a public health policy, for example, and then hires an advertising firm
for the public education campaign. In the monument context, the parallel
example would be those cases where a city council voted to honor its Iraq War
veterans and then established a public-private commission to hire a sculptor
and raise funds. Pleasant Grove involves the next level, where a government
votes to accept an offered monument that conveys an express message; the act
of agreeing to accept ownership of the monument and display it on government
property is a ratification of that message.' 30 Even where a donated monument
lacks a specific expressive message, however, as with an abstract sculpture,
municipalities still make an affirmative decision regarding whether the broad
thematic message conveyed by the offered monument is consistent with that
municipality's broad identity message. Those types of messages may not
always be expressly stated, but they often can be derived from a municipality's
public promotional statements, which frequently appear to summarize the
administration's essential vision of the community.'
3'
128. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
129. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553-55 (2005).
130. At least at oral argument, a number of the Justices appeared to agree that display of a
monument on government property shows that government has adopted that message. For
example, Justice Alito asked, "Isn't merely allowing the monument to be built on public property
sufficient acceptance?", Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 48, and Justice Souter
noted that no one would doubt that a homeowner who agreed to display a McCain sign on his
lawn supported McCain, id at 49.
131. E.g., compare Welcome to Village of Hinsdale, Illinois, http://www.villageof
hinsdale.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (describing municipality as one of "natural beauty,
hometown charm, and a friendly community atmosphere"), with Oak Park, Illinois, Village
Background, http://www.oak-park-us./VillageBackground.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008)
(describing municipality as "known for its architectural heritage and diverse population,"
followed by details on diversity).
2008)
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3. Political Accountability and the A4PEs
The underlying rationale for allowing government speech in the face of
differing views is the existence of political accountability. Accordingly,
"[w]hen the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the
political process for its advocacy."' 32  That rationale is better satisfied by
municipal display of donated monuments than by any of the Supreme Court
government speech cases thus far.
Municipal decisions on donated monuments easily satisfy the Johanns
majority's minimalist interpretation of the political accountability requirement;
under its rule, all that is required is legislative involvement and administrative
control.1 33  Applying that standard to municipal park monuments, political
accountability is enhanced by virtue of the closer connection between citizens
and their local government, as compared with federal, or even state,
governments. 134
Johanns has been widely criticized for its thin requirements for political
accountability, and correspondingly expansive take on government speech,
because it exemplifies ventriloquism.'3 5 As Justice Souter stated in his dissent,
few Americans would be aware that the government was behind
advertisements with "the tagline, '[funded by America's Beef Producers."" 
36
Decisions on monuments, by contrast, are transparent. Unlike line items in a
complex budget, monuments displayed in city parks cannot be hidden from
public view. There is no need for a "sunshine law"'137 to expose monuments to
political commentary. When a private organization's monument is
permanently installed on public land, people naturally expect that the
municipality was involved and has granted prior express permission.'
38
132. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
(quoted in Johanns, 544 U.S. at 575 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
133. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563-64.
134. Cf Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Reps. of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584,
598 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding state taxpayers to same standing requirements as federal taxpayers
for Establishment Clause-based suits). Applying Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007), which narrowly circumscribed taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause suits, the Seventh Circuit noted in Hinrichs that the Court has always treated standing of
municipal taxpayers more generously because their connection to the use of municipal funds is
deemed more "'direct and immediate."' Hinrichs, 506 F.3d at 590-93 (quoting Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923)) (citing Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007)).
135. See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 983, 988-89 (2005) ("[W]hen the government participates in public debate, it should make
the fact of its participation transparent.... [T]he legitimacy of those communications depends on
the public's ability to identify what the government says and how it does so.").
136. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
137. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
138. See, e.g., Grafv. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Chi., Ill.,
Mun. Code § 10-28-040) (discussing a typical ordinance generally prohibiting erection of
structures or stationary objects on any public ground); Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d
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Typically, as in Pleasant Grove, a plaque states that the monument was
"donated" or "presented" by the named donor to the city.' 39  Because this
statement adequately conveys the message that the monument now is owned
by the government, it should not be necessary for the municipality to post an
additional affirmative statement on the same (or another) plaque, stating: "Any
message expressed by this monument is from the government.' 40  Similarly,
where a city council has affirmatively voted to accept and display a specific
monument-whether the Ten Commandments, Iraq War veterans' memorial,
or an avant-garde sculpture-the council should not also need to pass a
resolution expressly claiming that monument's message as its own.
14 '
1045, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that there is no First Amendment right to install a
sculpture on government property; sale of art to government gave government the discretion to
determine location of any display); see also LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 90, 126-27 (noting the
difference in public perception between monuments, which have the government's imprimatur
and, for example, airport solicitors, which people assume are merely tolerated by the government
in deference to First Amendment rights). Newsracks are a distinguishable case. Because
freedom of the press is an independent guarantee, municipal permission to install a newsrack
conveys no governmental approval of the content of the newspapers. Thus, City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412, 429-30 (1993) (finding city ban on newsracks for
commercial handbills, but not newspapers, impermissible content-based regulation), is inapposite
here.
139. Interpreting an Eagles' donor plaque virtually identical to the one in Pleasant Grove,
one leading scholar stated that "the inscription implies, clearly and correctly, that it is the state
which owns the monument. These Ten Commandments are, literally and constitutionally, the
state's own words." Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 8 (2005). See infra Part V.B.I. for a discussion of the
Establishment Clause implications here.
140. But see Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1482-83 (2001) (rejecting use of the government speech
approach to avoid unwanted attribution and requiring use of disclaimers for that purpose). Cf
Dolan, supra note 7, at 126 (asserting that disclaimers are ineffective or inappropriate in certain
contexts). As shown throughout this Article, monuments displayed on government property are
another context where disclaimers are not needed to clarify the government's role.
A recent comprehensive account of government speech, Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008), proposes that
the government speech defense be allowed only under two conditions: (1) "government must
expressly claim the speech as its own when it authorizes or creates a communication and [(2)]
onlookers must understand the message to be government's at the time of its delivery." Id. at
599. While the "expressly claim" language may suggest Summum's counsel's requirement that
the city must explicitly "adopt" the Ten Commandments monument before it can use a
government speech defense, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 37-38, Professor
Norton recently wrote that under her framework, Pleasant Grove City has a strong claim for
government speech where it is using its own property for an expressive purpose, Posting of Helen
Norton to First Amendment Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/firstamendment/
2008/10/city-parks-monu.html (Oct. 31, 2008).
141. See Brief for Respondent at 33-34, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737
(Aug. 15, 2008) (No. 07-665) (suggesting the need for express control of content through
resolution or a sign stating that monument is government's message).
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Catholic University Law Review
The MPEs again underscore the practical realities. As shown in the
Appendix, when citizens find a monument offensive, they turn to their
municipal government for redress. The letters, public protests, and lawsuits
142
show that citizens believe that the government-and not the original private
donor-is responsible for the objectionable state of affairs. Sometimes the
municipality will respond to a citizen's complaint,143 and sometimes the
municipality does not'44-but its officials can always be held politically
accountable.
B. Application of the Circuit Courts' Four Factors
Various circuit courts have applied the relatively new government speech
doctrine to expressive contexts beyond the government-funded programs that
the Supreme Court has addressed. For example, two leading cases involved
government speech that acknowledged private sponsors of public expressive
projects, 45 and much recent litigation and commentary has focused on states'
specialty license plate programs. 46 These courts have developed a four-factor
test that evaluates: (1) "the central purpose" of the challenged speech; (2) the
municipality's "degree of editorial control"; (3) "the identity of the literal
speaker"; and (4) whether "ultimate responsibility for the content of the
speech" rested with the municipality. 1
47
In an earlier case, Summum v. City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit applied these
factors incorrectly and concluded that a Ten Commandments monument in a
similar context was the donors' private speech;' 48 the court did not repeat this
process in Pleasant Grove when finding the monument to be private speech.
149
142. See Appendix (displaying responses to question No. 16, regarding "Public Opposition to
the Existence or Location of Monument").
143. Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 32 (Moorhead, Minn.) (changing the wording on a
private-donor-initiated "Norwegian Stave Church" display to make the tone "more historical,
[and] less religious").
144. E.g., id. No. 26 (Neenah, Wis.) (noting that the "Playing in the Rain" fountain was
opposed by neighbors, but "city leaders stuck by the decision to place the fountain in the
downtown park," and it is now a "beloved landmark[]").
145. Wells v. City of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141-43 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a
sign listing corporate sponsors of city's holiday display was government speech, not forum
speech, and there was no First Amendment obligation to allow other private speech); Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-95 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that for a public radio station to reject the KKK as a sponsor, and thus exclude it from
broadcast acknowledgement of sponsors, did not violate the First Amendment).
146. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (asserting that
message on specialty license plate was primarily private speech, and thus created a limited public
forum). See also infra note 156 (discussing additional cases).
147. E.g., Stanton, 515 F.3d at 964 (internal quotation marks omitted); Wells, 257 F.3d at
1141.
148. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 997-98, 1004-06 (10th Cir. 2002).
149. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2, 1050-52 (10th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665).
[Vol. 58:7
Why Monuments are Government Speech
So, although the factors are simply rough markers for the control and
accountability issues just discussed, this Part will show specifically how
Ogden's reasoning on each factor was based on a superficial, and impractical,
understanding of the donated monument context.
1. Municipalities Expressive Purpose
A municipality's central purpose for accepting and displaying a privately
donated monument is universally expressive. As documented above,
municipalities seek to enhance landscape aesthetics and to express a message,
whether symbolic or literal, general or specific. 150 The Tenth Circuit in Ogden
made two critical errors: (1) it focused on the monument's "avowed purpose,"
of advancing the donors' view that the Ten Commandments provide "a moral
code for youth"; and (2) it rejected a municipal expressive purpose because
"the City [had] no idea as to the meaning of parts of the Monument,
particularly the Phoenician letters."'
51
To start, the Tenth Circuit's assumptions about city governments are
incorrect: it would not be common for a mayor, or even a planning
commissioner, to be familiar with every symbol on a particular monument, or
every theme intended by a sculptor. For example, despite the grand scale of
the City of Chicago's Millennium Park project, Mayor Richard Daley was
involved in the selection process for the several landmark public-art
installations.' 52  Nonetheless, neither he nor many other participating city
administrators would be likely to know specifically, for example, that the
videos displayed on the Crown Fountain include one thousand Chicago
citizens, or that the faces are "a reference to the traditional use of gargoyles in
fountains, where faces of mythological beings were sculpted with open mouths
to allow water, a symbol of life, to flow out."' 53 That practical reality does not
change the city administration's evident expressive purpose: showcasing
Chicago as bold, modem, and world-class.
In addition, the first factor asks not what the donors of a monument had in
mind, but rather, what was the city's purpose in agreeing to display the
monument. 154 When Pleasant Grove's city council voted to accept the Eagles'
proffered monument, many of its members likely agreed with the Eagles'
stated purpose of providing a positive effect on youth and it is also likely that
150. See discussion supra Part I.C.
151. Ogden, 297F.3dat 1004.
152. See GILFOYLE, supra note 94, at 290. The six-year, $475,000,000 project also included
Anish Kapoor's Cloud Gate sculpture and Frank Gehry's Pritzker Pavilion. Millennium Park,
Cloud Gate, http://www.millenniumpark.org/artandarchitecture/cloudgate.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2008); Millennium Park, Jay Pritzker Pavilion, http://www.millenniumpark.org/artand
architecture/Jay PritzkerPavilion.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
153. See Millennium Park, The Crown Fountain, http://www.millenniumpark.org/artand
architecture/crownfountain.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
154. See Wells v. City of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001).
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some members had their own expressive purpose in mind. 55 Also, municipal
monument displays show greater governmental expressive purpose than other
contexts where appellate courts have found government speech. Two leading
cases found this first factor satisfied by a very limited governmental expressive
purpose: thanking sponsors." 6  If the donor acknowledgment plaques on
monuments are government speech, the more substantive messages conveyed
by donated veterans' memorials and monuments of town founders should be as
well.
2. Municipalities'Editorial Control
Municipalities exercise editorial control over donated monuments through a
variety of means, even where the government does not participate in creating
them or require the donor to change the proffered gift as a condition of display.
In Ogden, the Tenth Circuit held that this second factor was not met because
the Eagles' monument was donated as a finished product. 157  The relevant
inquiry is whether the government has the right to edit speech created by a
private organization, and not whether such editing was needed in a particular
instance. 158  Municipalities often exercise such control through prior
submission requirements, design input, requested modifications, written
criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content proposals.' 
59
An essential, unheralded, point is that municipal ownership of monuments
encompasses a right of ongoing editorial control. Pleasant Grove City retains
that ownership right regardless of its lack of involvement in designing the
monument. Imagine, for example, a city determines that one prominent
symbol on an existing monument is now widely viewed as a sign for a satanic
155. See infra Part V.B.1 for discussion of the Establishment Clause implications.
Legislative intent is often hard to determine conclusively. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 59, 60-64 (1988)
(stating that ascertaining "the mental pattern of the legislature" assumes that it speaks with one
voice and "ignores the fact that laws are born of compromise"). This may be especially true on
the city council level, which typically produces fewer records than the federal and even state
levels; the published decisions do not include any such discussion.
156. See Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141-42; Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ.
of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2000).
In the specialty-license-plate cases, some courts have held that the first factor is not met
because the state's primary purpose when it sells these plates is to raise revenue. E.g., Ariz. Life
Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C
4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007). Other courts conclude differently despite
the revenue-raising aspect. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d
370, 371-72, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding where legislature affirmatively voted to create a
"Choose Life" specialty plate, its primary purpose was government speech); Planned Parenthood
of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding primary purpose of the specialty
license plate program to promote pro-life views).
157. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2002).
158. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 561-62 (2005).
159. See supra Part III.A.
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cult or warring gang: that city likely would exercise its editorial control by
modifying the statue, if possible, or by removing it. Nor is this scenario far-
fetched. One commentator wrote of a four-sided monument in Santa Fe, New
Mexico, which describes fallen heroes from various conflicts, using the
language of the applicable era. 16 On one side that refers to Native Americans,
the word "Savage" has been carved out, unofficially.' 61 In addition, a plaque
has been added that attempts to explain and excuse the use of the terms
"savage" and "rebel" and expresses hope for changed attitudes.' Sanford
Levinson, a leading legal scholar on monuments, provides a number of other,
lengthier examples of government modification of existing monuments to
adapt to new values. 163 The most striking story is that of various attempts to
alter or eliminate the message conveyed by New Orleans' "Liberty
Monument," which memorialized a Reconstruction Era white supremacist
battle. 164 Because permanent monuments continue to display their messages as
generations pass and cultures change, the government's editorial control over
them is not limited to one point in time.
Even in the unusual case where the donated monument arrives sight unseen,
municipalities retain two additional types of editorial control. First, the
installation process itself offers city personnel at least a last-minute chance to
see the monument before it is erected, and thus to refuse any content that
undermines the municipality's overall identity message. Second, it is generally
easier to exercise editorial control over the smaller, often removable, plaque
that acknowledges a private donor. Imagine a sign that read, "Donated by the
Eagles to Assist Metropolis in its Mission to Promulgate the Word of the One
True God." Any municipal lawyer would advise her client of the
unconstitutionality of such language, and the municipality would likely require
a modified message as a condition of its display.1
65
160. Robert Justin Lipkin, Down with Flags, Statues, and Monuments: Cultural Memory in a
Deliberative Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 239, 262 (2000).
161. Id. at 263. The plaque originally read: "To the Heroes Who Have Fallen in the Battles
with the Savage Indians in the Territory of New Mexico." Id at 262. "[T]he plaque now reads
[in part]: 'Battles with [ ] Indians."' Id. at 263 (third alteration in original).
162. Id. at 263. The new caveat includes: "Monument texts reflect the character of the times
in which they are written .... Attitudes change and prejudices hopefully dissolve." Id.
163. LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 4.
164. See id. at 45-52 (explaining various attempts to tear down the monument and efforts to
change its signage, including the current, vague caveat: "A CONFLICT OF THE PAST THAT SHOULD
TEACH US LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE").
165. Cf Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1094
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding second factor of retained control met where public radio staff composed,
reviewed, and edited sponsor acknowledgements to ensure compliance with FCC and station
guidelines).
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3. Municipalities As Literal Speakers
The Tenth Circuit in Ogden acknowledged that upon the transfer of a
monument's ownership, the municipality becomes the "literal speaker," yet it
hesitated to declare this third factor satisfied because the Eagles had composed
the speech.166 Under Johanns, however, a message may be government speech
even where the exact words are composed by private persons.
67
There has been much analysis of this third prong in the specialty license
plate cases, which also involve a passive symbolic message involving both
government and individuals. 168  Typically, state legislatures authorize a
proposed new slogan, such as "Choose Life," upon application by an
association, which assures the sale of a certain threshold number of plates; then
individuals pay an additional fee for the plate, which expresses a message
affiliated with a favorite cause. 169 The majority view holds that the individual
vehicle owner is the literal speaker, based on his intentional display of the
government-manufactured values message and on both the reality, and the
public perception, that his message display is purposeful.
170
The monument display context presents an easier case, and a less mixed
message, on this factor. Applying the majority reasoning, Pleasant Grove City
is the literal speaker because the municipality is intentionally displaying a
message originally created by a private group, in circumstances where the
public perception is that municipalities are responsible for any messages
conveyed by monuments located in municipal parks. In addition, the
166. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004-05 (10th Cir. 2002).
167. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-61 (2005).
168. E.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 619-23 (2008) (using these cases as a springboard for a
comprehensive analysis of the problem of mixed speech and proposing use of a rigorous
intermediate scrutiny standard); Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who's Talking Now:
"Choose Life" Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 229, 232-
34 (2005). Note that Justice Souter specifically recognized the issue as a problem of "mixed
speech" in the oral argument, asking "isn't the tough issue here the claim that there is-is in fact a
mixture, that it is both Government and private.... [Hlow do you think we ought to deal with
the mixture issue." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 10-11.
169. Corbin, supra note 168, at 620 & n.72 (reviewing details of state programs and noting
fourteen states with at least one hundred such plates and eight states with at least fifty).
170. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting
cases); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *6 (N.D. I11. Jan. 19,
2007) ("[T]he specialty plate gives private individuals the option to identify with, purchase, and
display one of the authorized messages. Indeed, no one who sees a specialty license plate
imprinted with the phrase 'Choose Life' would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a pro-
life viewpoint."), rev'd in part, vacated in part, No. 07-1349, 2008 WL 4821759, at *9 (7th Cir.
Nov. 7, 2008) (writing that the circuit courts' four-part test "can be distilled (and simplified) by
focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person
consider the speaker to be the government or a private party?"). Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 713, 715 (1977) (holding that because any message on a license plate is connected with
the owner or driver of the vehicle, requiring all residents to display the state's motto on their cars'
license plates is unconstitutional compelled speech).
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monument donor's act is a one-time event; whatever message is communicated
by the monument was the donor's message at the point of conveyance, and
may not be today. But the municipality that continues to display the
monument, without any modification or added explanation, is "speaking" its
message on a long-term, ongoing basis.
4. Municipalities' Ultimate Responsibility
It seems reasonably apparent that municipalities bear "ultimate
responsibility" for the content of monuments they display. The Tenth Circuit
in Ogden recognized this, holding this fourth factor satisfied because "[aifter
the City acquired title to the Monument, . . . presumably the City could have
sold, re-gifted, modified, or even destroyed the Monument at will."' 17 1 In the
MPEs, the majority of respondents with personal knowledge answered that the
municipalities they represent have legal ownership and physical control of the
donated monuments.
Even in the absence of clear government ownership, however, the "ultimate
responsibility" factor is demonstrated by municipalities' legal responsibility
for monuments in their parks. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Wells, where
the plaintiff claimed that a government holiday display acknowledging
sponsors opened a private-speech forum, "this litigation is itself an indication
that the City bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the display."'
73
Regarding donated monuments, anyone who alleges some harm caused to them
by a statue in a park, whether physical, emotional, or constitutional, will sue
the municipality. It is highly unlikely that anyone would take legal action
against the original donor of the statue, even if their contribution is
acknowledged by a donor plaque. 174  In sum, all the judicial factors and
rationales for applying the government speech paradigm point toward this
conclusion: once a city accepts and displays a monument in a public park, it
becomes the govemment's speech.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS IN THIS CONTEXT
A. Strict Scrutiny's Inconsistency with Local Expression
The Tenth Circuit took an unusual step, with severe practical consequences,
when it held that the municipal display of privately donated monuments in
171. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2002).
172. See Appendix (listing responses to question Nos. 9-12).
173. Wells v. City of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting radio
station's ultimate responsibility for all broadcasts, including sponsor acknowledgments, because
station was subject to legal sanctions for failure to comply with its statutory obligations).
174. Cf LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 33 (describing a New York Times report that "at least one
lawsuit has been filed, in Franklin, Tennessee, seeking not only removal of a statue of a
Confederate soldier that towers over the town square but also $44 million in damages").
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public parks creates a public forum for such monuments. 75 If a city's display
of a single donated monument, from any era, inadvertently transforms a park
into a public forum for the installation of private monuments, then the
community loses all voice in fashioning its permanent landmarks.
When regulating speech in a public forum, of course, cities may
constitutionally employ only content-neutral regulations.176 Here, that would
include safety regulations, such as those used for other types of private
structures on the 7public way, and allocation rules used to distribute public-
space resources.' For example, there is a limit on the number and location of
large-scale public gatherings that are possible at any one time in municipal
parks; thus, the Court has approved permit systems that assign such space to
permit-applicants on a first-in-time basis.
178
As a practical matter, application of these public-forum rules here would
mean that city governments would be forced to accept and install private
monuments on the basis that they are structurally sound. Open public park
space is limited and highly prized. Permanent monuments, which require
expensive installation, are a unique type of use that is distinguishable from
more temporary uses. 179  To require a content-neutral, "first-come, first
displayed," private monument policy-or no private monuments at all-risks
permanently destroying a valuable, longstanding form of community
expression.
That approach leaves municipalities confronted with donations of offensive
monuments with little recourse but to purge their parks of donated
monuments -a harsh result that should trouble those on both sides of the
political spectrum and the Decalogue debate. As noted, Fred Phelps already
has proffered scripture-quoting, anti-homosexual monuments to cities within
175. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050-52 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665).
176. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
177. See, e.g., CITY OF CHICAGO, IL., MUN. CODE, § 10-28-750 et seq. (newsracks); id. § 10-
28-800 et seq. (advertising benches).
178. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 318, 325 (2002) (citing CHICAGO PARK DIST.
CODE, ch. VII, §§ C.3.a(1), C.5.a.).
179. That governments often spend large amounts of taxpayer funds for the installation
process highlights that difference. See supra text accompanying note 99 ($40,000 for installation
of donated fountain in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin); supra note 11l (Richmond, Virginia,
appropriated $45,000 for granite plaza for donated Lincoln statue).
For that reason, Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758, 770
(1995) (holding that denial of Ku Klux Klan's request to place a cross in public square during
Christmas season violated First Amendment), provides no traction here. Unattended temporary
displays over a period of days or weeks, such as the holiday displays and art festival booths that
previously had been allowed there, are more similar to assemblies than to structures, especially in
terms of their effect on the public's use of the space.
180. Cf Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791
& n.l, 817 (1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting all signs on public property, including light
poles where private speakers frequently posted signs).
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the Tenth Circuit and, to refuse this spiteful symbol without legal risk, Boise,
Idaho, removed its pre-existing Ten Commandments monument.' Although
that result may seem appropriate to many, on the other side of the cultural
divide, donated monuments promoting tolerance and gay rights, such as one
displayed in Madison, Wisconsin, are also at risk.182 Boise also enacted a new
policy for monuments, prohibiting those that are "inflammatory or
discriminatory."' 183 As shown in the next section, that kind of limitation has
little chance of success without a Supreme Court holding that donated
monuments are government speech.
B. Limited Public Forum Analysis Is Unworkable Here
The more expected option is to categorize a city's display of privately
donated monuments as a limited public forum. But a closer look shows that
this, too, is a bad alternative. The doctrine provides that where the government
invites private speakers to use public property in a manner that is not generally
open to the public, the government may set reasonable content limitations, so
long as they are viewpoint-neutral.184  But limited public forum analysis is
unworkable here for two reasons. First, any accumulation of privately donated
monuments occurs over a long period of time, encompassing numerous
administrations and evolving cultural norms. Because monuments are not
erected as part of a program, there is no reason to set pre-established content
limitations. Second, any potentially appropriate criteria, such as "relates to
local history and culture," are subjective, and thus inherently reflect the
decision-makers' viewpoints-and that violates the limited public forum test.
To begin, the limited public forum test does not fit a context where years
may go by between proposals for a new monument in a town. Consequently,
many municipalities do not have a written policy, or even an established
practice, regarding the types of donated monuments they accept.' s 5 The MPEs
181. See Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 229 (Boise, Idaho); supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
182. See Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 56 (Madison, Wis.); Appendix (listing the
Madison monument in the responses to Question No. 16). Cf Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, as one of the original analogous
"government speech" cases, a school bulletin board promoting gay and lesbian awareness month
was government speech, and therefore teacher had no First Amendment right to post anti-
homosexual materials).
183. Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 229 (Boise, Idaho).
184. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
This Article uses the term "limited public forum" throughout to mean a context where the
Perry "reasonable content limitations/no viewpoint discrimination" test applies. There continues
to be controversy in the courts about terminology, and whether a "nonpublic forum" is equivalent.
See Dolan, supra note 7, at 77 n.27 (analyzing at length); see also Summum v. City of Ogden,
297 F.3d 995, 1002 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2002).
185. In an earlier article I proposed, as one limiting criteria for government speech, that the
viewpoint expressed must be consistent with the government's stated program purposes and
limitations. See Dolan, supra note 7, at 114. That proposal does not transfer well to the
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showed only a small number of municipalities with such written policies, 186
and most of those appeared to be enacted either to govern programs for
regularly occurring memorials, which is a distinguishable context, or in the
aftermath of litigation.' 87 Under the familiar limited public forum standards,
when a court finds no established content limitations within an alleged
"limited" public forum, the court applies strict scrutiny. 188  Where
municipalities never intended to create a forum for private speech, this is the
wrong result.
Second, municipalities rightly want to create a positive, welcoming
atmosphere in public parks, and doing so requires the discretion to decline
divisive monuments. For example, one municipality in the MPEs, which did
have an applicable written policy, set these criteria for monument donations:
"[They must] engender respect [and] address a community-wide concern." 189
Applying the limited public forum test, however, courts regularly have rejected
attempts to screen out hate groups, advocates of discrimination, public
controversy, and sectarian religious practices.' 90 Most compelling here are the
cases where states have been forced to include the Ku Klux Klan in the Adopt-
a-Highway program, in which government signs posted by the side of the road
publicly acknowledge the listed organization for its work in keeping that
somewhat unique, symbolic role of monuments. Part V of this Article provides other limits on
government speech that apply to monuments, as well as additional reasons that finding
government speech here is consistent with broader First Amendment values.
186. See Appendix (listing responses to questions Nos. 5-6, where only 16 out of 117
Applicable Responses had written policies and only 21 asserted "established practices").
Especially where the monuments displayed were initiated by private donors, expecting a
written policy does not make sense. Regarding the circumstances of the donation, 71 Responses
answered that the municipality had only "private-donor initiated" (PDI) monuments, 6 answered
that that the municipality had only monuments where the "private donor responded to municipal
request for proposals" (PDR), and 101 gave multiple responses, including monuments that were
PDI. (Note that the third choice for this question was "other.") See Appendix; see also IMLA
Brief, supra note 9, app. B, at 6a.
187. For example, some municipalities allow individuals to purchase a bench or tree for the
park and include a plaque honoring a deceased family member. These programs-differing in
kind and scope from the occasional acceptance of a monument-are more likely to be held
limited public forums. Cf Tong v. Chicago Park Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 645, 647-48 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (holding that fundraiser where donors gave money in exchange for opportunity to inscribe
brick for park walkway was a limited public forum, so that impermissible viewpoint
discrimination where rejected the religious message: "Jesus is the cornerstone").
188. See, e.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248,
252, 255 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding advertising space in SEPTA train and bus stations a designated
public forum, so that strict scrutiny applied, due to "SEPTA's practice of permitting virtually
unlimited access to the forum").
189. See Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 54 (Kalispell, Mont.). Other examples from the
MPEs of standards for donated monuments include: Missoula, Montana (No. 98) ("[A]II
installations [must] be approved for content, political/public acceptability and legality as well as
derogatory language or images."); South Portland, Maine (No. 52) ("[Sluitable public purpose
related to location and no endorsement of political or religious viewpoints[.]").
190. See Dolan, supra note 7, at 84-91 (collecting and analyzing cases).
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stretch of highway clean.' 91  The distinction between approaches is most
noticeable when comparing these Adopt-a-Highway cases with the government
speech case in University of Missouri, where the court allowed the University
to refuse to accept, and thus be able to avoid publicly acknowledging, the KKK
as a public radio sponsor. 192 In an earlier article, I argued that the difference
lies in attribution: under some circumstances, where the context is an
"endorsement relationship," so that forced inclusion of the private speaker
would alter a government's broad identity message, such acknowledgement
may be government speech. 193 The limited public forum doctrine does not
provide a shield against monuments that are harmful to a community's spirit or
its individual members. In that respect, it offers little improvement over the
public forum problem.
Two cases illustrate my position that the government speech paradigm is
preferable to limited public forum analysis in the monument context. First,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens broke new ground
by finding government speech where the government partnered with the
private sector to create and display public art. 194  The case involved
Washington, D.C.'s temporary sidewalk sculpture display of one hundred
donkeys and one hundred elephants, entitled "Party Animals."'195 The city
rejected a proposed entry from the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
191. See, e.g., Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 737-39 (8th Cir. 2004); Cuffley v.
Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2000).
192. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1087,
1095 (8th Cir. 2000). In a 2004 article, I pointed out:
The most straightforward way of interpreting the University of Missouri case is to cite
the Eighth Circuit's observation that there is no First Amendment right to have one's
money accepted as a contribution to a government enterprise, and thus no
corresponding right to make the government publicly thank the individual for that
money. That is a facile solution, though, because ... the Adopt-a-Highway cases could
be portrayed the same way, but there was a different outcome. The courts could have
said that there is no First Amendment right to be allowed to clean up a public highway,
and thus no corresponding right to force the government to acknowledge an
organization's work and publicize its name[, but it did not].
Dolan, supra note 7, at 123 (footnote omitted). See also Norton, supra note 140, at 135-41
(analyzing the contrast between the government thanks in the Adopt-a-Highway and the sponsor
acknowledgements in University of Missouri and Wells).
193. Dolan, supra note 7, at 121-27. Note that my argument is not based in any claim that
the government itself has protectable First Amendment rights. Id. at 125. But see David
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 1676-77 (2006)
(arguing for First Amendment protection of government speech under circumstances where
constitutive of the entity's public function and supportive of democratic self-governance).
194. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 25, 28 (D.C. Cir.
2005). Cf People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-23
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 18 Fed. App'x 35 (2d Cir. 2001) (earlier case with similar outcome that
relied on government speech principles, while purportedly applying limited public forum
doctrine).
195. Gittens, 414 F.3d at 25.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
(PETA), "a sad, shackled circus elephant," on the grounds that its portrayal of
cruelty did not meet the stated criterion that the sculptures be "festive and
whimsical.' 96 The rejected entry featured a crying, shackled elephant with a
sign tacked to its side that read: "The Circus is coming. See SHACKLES-
BULL HOOKS-LONELINESS. All under the 'Big Top."" 97 PETA had
argued, and the district court agreed, that because the city had accepted other
sculptures that were not festive, including tributes to 9/11 heroes and civil
rights leaders, its rejection was viewpoint discrimination. 198 The appellate
court held instead that the sculptures displayed were government speech,
within the Forbes-Finley model, because the municipal decision-makers
retained the right to approve designs and to reject any entries they considered
inappropriate.
19
Gittens demonstrates well the need for government discretion in public
expressive projects that involve private speech. One can imagine the project
organizers' concern that PETA's entry could negatively affect the tone of the
entire public-art display, half of which consisted of elephant sculptures.
Historical tributes, by contrast, could be judged as likely to have an inspiring,
and more limited, effect. No specific, objective, pre-established content
limitation can provide for that type of good-faith line-drawing.
The second case, Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, also held for the
municipality,20 but only did so by stretching limited-public-forum analysis to
its breaking point. Putnam H is unique in that it is the only published case
20 1involving a municipal website with hyperlinks to private web pages. There,
a non-resident, Mr. Davidian, became obsessed with an unsolved murder in
Cookeville and started a website describing the city's alleged corruption.
202
After denying Davidian's request to add his website to the city's "local links"
web page, the city adopted a policy that hyperlinks must not only relate to city
services, attractions, and officials, but also must promote the city's tourism and
economic welfare. 20 3 Davidian then added a tourism page to his web page,
196. Id. at 26.
197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Id. at 27.
199. Id. at29-30.
200. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville (Putnam I1), 76 F. App'x 607, 609 (6th Cir.
2003).
201. See id. at 610. To date, the only similar case is Page v. Lexington County School
District One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding, in a case where a school district's web page
stated its opposition to a pending "school choice" bill, and hyperlinked to the websites of two
organizations also fighting the legislation, the state school board association and a private
organization formed to oppose the bill, that those hyperlinks were the school district's
government speech).
202. Putnam II, 76 F. App'x at 610.
203. Id. at 611.
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which included information about health department restaurant investigations,
and also claimed that his scrutiny of the city was in its long-term welfare.
204
In Putnam I, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of the city on the hyperlink claim, because the discretionary
standard and its application suggested viewpoint discrimination, which violates
the limited public forum test. 2U In Putnam H, however, the court upheld the
jury's finding that, because Davidian's website was critical of the city and its
officials, it was outside the content limitation of "promoting" the city; thus,
they did not reach the issue of viewpoint discrimination. Categorizing
speech that promotes a government as a "content limitation"--and saying that
excluding speech that criticizes that government is not "viewpoint
discrimination"--tums these concepts inside out. The essential point of
prohibiting "viewpoint discrimination" is to ban government from excluding
from a speech venue those speakers who are critical of the administration. The
Putnam approach is an inadequate resolution of the doctrinal dilemmas in
public-private expressive partnerships.
It must be the case that there are some contexts, perhaps especially in the
selection of monuments, where government is allowed to engage in
community-building, promotional expression. The limited public forum
paradigm cannot accommodate this goal. When a city does provide a content
limitation, such as "monuments that are limited to local history," often the
unstated modifier is "history that reflects well on the town and makes citizens
proud and united." To approve that content limitation would gut the
constitutional purpose of the viewpoint discrimination ban. To commemorate
a favorable version of history, at least where government partners with any
private persons, requires courts to use the lens of the government-speech
doctrine.
To illustrate, one Missouri town explained in the MPEs that it "rejected [a]
plaque to commemorate illegal hangings by [a] mob of three black men in [the]
early nineteen hundreds in the public square," on the grounds that the
"language was inciting and not necessarily accurate."207 At the same time, the
town allowed a plaque regarding the "first recorded gunfight west of [the]
Mississippi," involving "Wild Bill Hickock.",208 This line-drawing, of course,
can be characterized as viewpoint discrimination. Yet one plaque evokes a
colorful past that may stimulate tourism because vacationing families enjoy
play-acting, and the other is a permanent reminder of a painful chapter in
history, which may increase racial division among today's citizens.
Concluding that this decision is government speech does not undermine the
204. Id. at 61t, 613.
205. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville (Putnam 1), 221 F.3d 834, 845-46 (6th Cir. 2000).
206. Putnam II, 76 F. App'x at 614.
207. Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 30.
208. Id.
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rights of private speakers to broadcast this aspect of the town's history, nor is it
inconsistent with the town itself deciding to publicize the incident in an
educational or museum venue. Only the government speech doctrine fosters
the valid municipal function of shaping public parks as welcoming spaces.
The next Part explains why allowing this application of government speech
enhances, rather than limits, private speech on monument topics.
V. THE BENEFITS OF RECOGNIZING MONUMENT DISPLAY AS GOVERNMENT
SPEECH
For good reason, from the beginning scholars have been critical of the
government speech approach as it has evolved in Supreme Court opinions.20
9
The two leading cases on the expression of particular government policies
through private speakers implicated the main concerns: (1) the risk of
government control of or interference with the private speech market, 210 and
(2) political accountability for its role.211 Rust v. Sullivan involved a "gag
rule" on family planning providers; the case upheld a law limiting federal
funding to those clinics where medical personnel agreed not to discuss the
abortion option with their patients. 212  In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n, beef producers lost a compelled-speech case, even though they were
taxed to pay for television advertisements which, in turn, proclaimed to the
public that the ads were paid for by "America's Beef Producers., 21 3 And the
Court's speech selection cases, especially United States v. American Library
214 215Ass'n, raised concerns of government censorship.
In contrast, municipal acceptance and display of donated monuments raises
fewer, if any, of these concerns. As shown in Part III, citizens recognize and
respond to the messages conveyed by donated park monuments as government
speech. Part V shows that recognizing government speech in this context does
not diminish, and sometimes even enhances, the private-speech market.
Finally, there is an additional benefit: constitutional and political limits suggest
209. See infra notes 212-13.
210. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1990).
211. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 563-64 (2005).
212. Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-80. Rust sparked "sharply critical academic commentary."
Robert C. Post, Essay, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 168 & n. 103 (1996) (collecting
articles).
213. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553-55, 566-67. See also Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association,
Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 317, 321 & n.26 (2007) (collecting
criticism of Johanns).
214. 539 U.S. 194, 198-201 (2003) (upholding as govemment speech a federal-funding
condition requiring public libraries to use Internet-pomography filtering device, although filter is
both over- and under-inclusive).
215. Id. at 234-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (regarding applications for federal arts funding screened for indecency
and "American values").
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that, as applied to monuments, government speech is likely to be more
inclusive and respectful of citizens than its wholly private counterpart.
A. Counter-Speech Options In Public Parks
The location of the challenged monument in Pleasant Grove actually cuts in
favor of finding government speech. Precisely because it is situated in a public
forum, there is ample opportunity for speech activities, including counter-
speech. In city parks, there is no reason for concern that a relatively small
amount of government speech, in the form of monuments of various pedigrees,
will crowd out or dominate the on-site private speech.2 16
The MPEs demonstrate this point and more, for municipal park locations
across the country. As it turns out, in some instances, the very existence of the
donated monument has a positive impact on private speech: it serves as a focal
point for protests and rallies. For example, in Kalispell, Montana, a private-
donor group recently sought and obtained the city council's permission to
place "a large bronze statue depicting an American soldier kneeling" in the
city's "most highly visible park., 217  The respondent stated: "Since the
monument was installed, the area has been used for rallies both for and against
the war in Iraq. 218  Similarly, in Boise, Idaho, there are frequently human
219
rights and other rallies around the Anne Frank Memorial. In fact, numerous
respondents with personal knowledge stated that they were aware of speech
activities related to their city's privately donated monument occurring around
that monument.22 °
The Summums, too, retain the opportunity to spread their message in
Pleasant Grove's parks through traditional public-forum speech activities, such
as organized gatherings and literature distribution. The disputed Ten
Commandments monument may also serve as a stimulus for counter-speech.
In the recent challenge to public library Internet pornography filters, Justices
Kennedy and Breyer both based their concurrences on the rationale that
because adults can ask libraries to turn off the filter, their speech rights are
216. Cf Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2587, 2588-90 (2007) (asserting that in various contexts,
such as protesting at political party conventions and in the presence of the president, the
regulation of "place" under the guise of security concerns is increasingly rendering dissent
invisible).
217. Survey Results, supra note 76, No. 54 (Kalispell, Mont.).
218. Id.
219. Id. No. 67 (Boise, Idaho).
220. See Appendix. Of the 117 Applicable Responses, 32 answered "yes" to the following
question: "Are you aware of any instances where members of the public engaged in any of the
above-described speech-related activities in the area(s) adjacent to the monument(s) where the
content of the speech was in some manner related to the monument(s) or its implied or stated
message(s)?"
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221minimally impaired. Similarly, First Amendment values do not require
mandating that Pleasant Grove City relieve the Summums of the effort of
conveying their religious message by traditional public-forum methods, and
instead allow them to leave a permanent stone text at the park location.
B. Constitutional and Political Limits
The government speech paradigm suits the permanent monument context
because the government is less free than private persons to speak in ways that
divide communities and insult citizens. Although some scholars have argued
for hate-speech restrictions on private expression, 222 for the most part the pride
of the First Amendment is its protection of even the most offensive speech.223
Allowing "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech is considered valuable
because it protects both the central value of autonomy and the free exchange of
ideas and information necessary for democratic self-governance. 224  Thus,
under the strict scrutiny used by the Tenth Circuit, and also under the limited
public forum alternative, Fred Phelps may display his statue quoting scripture
and condemning Matthew Shepard. But most governments would not do so,
and there is some constitutional support for the position that government could
not do so.
1. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause 226 provides the clearest constitutional constraint
on government speech. There is some irony in referring to that protection here,
of course, but the Establishment Clause is not an issue before the Court, nor
has it been part of the litigation.227  Instead, the Ten Commandments
221. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 593 U.S. 194, 214-15 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id at 219 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). The plurality
relied on the government speech rationale to uphold the federal filtering requirement. See id. at
211-14 & n.7 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
222. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 437; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321 (1989).
223. E.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding right of Nazis
to march in then-primarily Jewish suburb of Skokie, Illinois).
224. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 925-30 (3d ed. 2006) (reviewing the four
main theories underlying First Amendment freedom of expression as self-governance, truth,
autonomy, and tolerance). For a recent overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the First
Amendment speech clause jurisprudence, see Crocker, supra note 216, at 2592-96, 2602-08.
225. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
227. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047, 1048 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665). Summum's complaint alleged violations of the
U.S. Constitution's Free Speech Clause and the Utah Constitution's free expression and
establishment provisions. Id. at 1047. The Tenth Circuit held that Summum waived its Utah
Constitution claims because they were not argued on appeal. Id. at 1048 n.3.
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monument in Pleasant Grove City appears to share a physical and historical
context quite similar to the one upheld in Van Orden v. Perry.
228
The critical next question is whether express recognition of the monument as
government speech creates an additional analytical step, or is simply consistent
with the Supreme Court's reference to the "Texas display" in Van Orden.
229
Even if Van Orden implies as much, 23 an express holding that a government
Despite this fact, and despite the petitioner's counsel's consistent efforts to focus only on the
issues presented, the Ten Commandments monument was unavoidable at oral argument, from the
opening question, (Chief Justice Roberts: "Mr. Sekulow, you're really just picking your poison,
aren't you? I mean, the more you say that the monument is Government speech to get out of...
the Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you're walking into a trap under the
Establishment Clause," Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 4), through the last
question (Justice Souter: "The Government isn't disclaiming [the Ten Commandments
monument]. [Y]ou want this clear statement. . . . [1]t would also be the poison pill in the
Establishment Clause.... [T]hat's okay with me .... I was a Van Orden dissenter," id. at 63).
The issue before the Court, of course, is not whether the Ten Commandments must come down,
but whether the Free Speech Clause supports a court ordering the city to erect the Summum's
monument.
228. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82, 692 (2005). Both are one monument
among many in an outdoor park, existing without controversy for thirty-plus years, and both were
originally obtained from the Eagles as part of their nationwide campaign against juvenile
delinquency. Compare Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1046 (monument in park since donated by
Eagles in 1971), with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-03 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(monument sat unchallenged on Texas state grounds for forty years). Indeed, some facts in
Pleasant Grove are more favorable: Pioneer Park is not part of City Hall grounds (as compared
with the Texas State Capitol grounds), and Pleasant Grove arguably has a stronger historical
argument because the park as a whole commemorates the Mormon pioneer era of the city's
heritage. Pleasant Grove was one of the original Mormon pioneer towns in Utah, founded by a
group sent forth in 1850 by Brigham Young, leader of the original 1847 Mormon settlement in
Salt Lake City. See Pleasant Grove History, http://plgrove.org/index.php?option=comcontent
&task=view&id=2&ltemid=23 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008); Salt Lake City History,
http://www.utah.com/cities/slc history.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). According to Mormon
doctrine, the Book of Mormon is translated from Golden Plates that founder Joseph Smith
received from a visitation by an angel called Moroni in 1827. See Moroni: Messenger of
the Restoration, http://josephsmith.net/josephsmith/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=91 fa0fbab57f00lOVgn
VCMI00000If5e340aRCRD (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
For a few of the many law review articles interpreting Van Orden and McCreary, see, for
example, Vincent Mufioz, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments? McCreary, Van Orden,
and the Future of Religious Display Cases, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 357 (2006), and Douglas G.
Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 93 (2007). See also Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1010-11, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2008) (applying Van Orden, and holding that city's display of Eagles-donated Ten
Commandments monument on grounds of the Old City Hall, along with three war memorials, did
not violate Establishment Clause).
229. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to
"the Texas display [as] serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose").
230. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 8; CHEMERtNSKY, supra note 224, at 1225.
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit disagreed, instead concluding by saying that finding that the Texas
monument did not violate the Establishment Clause is not necessarily equivalent to finding
government speech, because under Capital Square v. Pinnette, a display on public property may
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can choose the Ten Commandments as its own message still would have strong
symbolic impact. The incremental approach already has performed substantial
work to change public perception of, and government policies regarding, the
boundaries between church and state. 
231
The symbolism of an explicit holding that a city's display of the Ten
Commandments is government speech carries some real risk of directly
advancing Justice Scalia's stated view that the government is free to promote
biblical monotheism without implicating the Establishment Clause. 23  Given
that the import of the "government-speech" label is that government can
control the content and express its preferred message, applying it to religious
speech presents a constitutional conundrum. The doctrinal contradictions are
evident in a recent series of cases that categorize legislative prayer, which has
been justified by its unique history, under the expanding doctrine of
government speech.233 Pleasant Grove's decision can be defended while still
violate the endorsement test based on appearances, even where the speech is in fact private.
Summum, 483 F.3d at 1047 n.2 (citing Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 774 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(controlling opinion)).
231. The incremental approach is demonstrated by the success of Jay Sekulow, counsel for
Petitioner Pleasant Grove, who has used the Free Speech Clause to break down earlier strict
separationist church-state principles to increase religious-use access in the limited public forum
context. The less controversial, generally approved opening of public-building doors to religious
viewpoints on social topics originated in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Lamb's Chapel led the way to the more troubling after-school
religious instruction and prayer in elementary schools in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), and then to lower court decisions requiring local government to
provide space for some worship services, as in DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558 (7th
Cir. 2001), albeit not yet weekly services, as shown by Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of
Education, 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
Another context where incremental legal changes have worked a powerful transformation of
public opinion and policy-one I welcome-is the expanding recognition of gay rights. See, e.g.,
Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality in New
Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERs L. REv. 291, 297-308
(2007) (summarizing history of rights won over the course of decades and the public's expanding
familiarity with, and acceptance of, gay families).
232. See supra notes 3-4.
233. Nonsectarian legislative prayer was upheld in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
based on its unique, longstanding practice dating back to the First Congress. Id. at 790.
Recently, courts evaluating Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause challenges to legislative prayer
practices have borrowed from the new government speech cases to reject the claims of private
speakers. See, e.g., Turner v. City Council Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2008)
(O'Connor, J.) (applying four-part government speech test used by Fourth Circuit in specialty
license plate cases and upholding city's nonsectarian prayer policy against claim that it violated
speaker's right to name Jesus). More disconcerting was a use of the doctrine to justify
government preference among religions. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County, 404 F.3d 276,
279-80, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 819 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)))
(rejecting excluded Wiccan's free speech and free exercise complaints re monotheistic prayer
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retaining a robust view of the Establishment Clause's neutrality mandate only
by emphasizing the secular portion of the mixed secular-sectarian message of
such monuments, which courts allowing such displays routinely have done.
234
This Article's analysis, however, suggests two potential arguments for why
Pleasant Grove City's Ten Commandments monument may violate the
Establishment Clause. First, in Van Orden itself and in most other Ten
Commandments cases (excluding those litigated by Summum), the plaintiff
was an offended observer, rather than a rejected counter speaker. 235 By
contrast, Pleasant Grove's continued display of the Ten Commandments-in
juxtaposition with its refusal to display the monument offered by a small
religion-arguably sends a message of exclusion. These circumstances, taken
as a whole, could be construed as broadly conveying the message: "This City
stands for traditional Judeo-Christian religion; it does not identify with or
support outsider 'fringe' religions." The very pursuit of extended litigation to
secure the right to continue displaying the Ten Commandments underscores
the strength of this subtext. Of course, to accept this argument would mean
that all government displays of Ten Commandments monuments or other
religious statues could be held hostage by any group claiming to be a religion
policy because legislative prayer is government speech, so that government is free to enlist
private speakers to convey its preferred content).
The use of the term "government speech" in Establishment Clause challenges generally leads
to a different result; thus, considering all uses of those words as one uniform doctrine is
problematic. Taking into account that private speech and government speech endorsing religion
are distinguishable, holding that ostensibly private speech should be deemed the government's
own speech for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis follows from cases like Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000), and not from Johanns or Finley.
See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1131 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (finding legislative prayer
by invited clergy government speech, and holding that allowing sectarian references, where vast
majority of speakers were Christian, violated Establishment Clause), rev 'd on standing grounds
sub nom. Hinrich v. Speaker of House of Representatives of Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584
(7th Cir. 2007). For a summary of the existing case law, see Robert Luther III & David B.
Caddell, Breaking Away From the "Prayer Police ": Why the First Amendment Permits Sectarian
Legislative Prayer and Demands a "Practice Focused" Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569,
571-73, (2008) (arguing that Marsh does not require restriction on sectarian references, and
looking instead to neutral selection procedures for, and broad community representation in,
legislative prayer speakers). My own extensive analysis of these factually wide-ranging cases is
beyond the scope of this Article; ultimately, I conclude that because legislative prayer is
considered sui generis, conditions placed upon it are best explained by reference to Marsh, and
that borrowing reasoning from Johanns or Finley further weakens the Establishment Clause.
234. Ironically, that was the argument put forth by Justice Scalia at oral argument. He
asserted that just as a city might erect a statue of George Washington to convey the message that
he is "worthy of respect" by the citizens, without endorsing everything Washington ever said, so
too can a city display a Ten Commandments monument for the limited message that it is "worthy
of respect." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 55-56.
235. See Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 33, 35-41 (2005) (summarizing Ten Commandments cases over the decade preceding Van
Orden).
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and seeking to install a monument, thus undermining the value of the
government speech label sought here. This dilemma, however, is the
predictable, politically divisive outcome that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has sought to avoid.236 On the other hand, Pleasant Grove City's
situation does not present the worst-case scenario. 237 The rejected speaker has
no connection to the local community, so that the monument decision does not
exclude the views of any local residents who belong to a religious minority
group.238 Even so, this line of reasoning supports the conclusion that, once
donated monuments are declared "government speech," display of a donated
monument expressing a religious message violates the Establishment Clause.
At a minimum, this must be true under circumstances, not present here, that
communicate governmental preference for some religious expressions over
others.
The second reason involves recalling one of the arguments for why donated
monuments are government speech: although the messages conveyed by
monuments may change over time as the culture changes, municipalities retain
an ongoing right of editorial control. Monuments to "defeating the savages"
become the wrong message, with a corresponding need for explanation or
modification. 239 It seems plausible that in 1971, the message conveyed by
accepting and displaying the Eagles' Ten Commandments did not violate the
Establishment Clause, at least as currently construed. For example, decision-
makers and observers alike may have understood its meaning as: "Here are the
rules of law by which we all strive to abide; if people are reminded of these
rules, then they will be inspired to obey the civil and criminal laws, benefiting
all." Now, however, the Decalogue has been one of the flash-points of the
"culture wars" for decades. 240 Today, expending years of effort litigating to
236. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1667, 1681-1708, 1722-23 (2006) (explaining history of politically divisive rationale for
Establishment Clause decisions, though rejecting that argument as unsound). See also Nelson
Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1272-73 (2008) (arguing in support of
government's ability to exclude religion from public programs in order to avoid emphasizing
harmful divisions among citizens).
237. Cf Colby, supra note 4, at 1098-99 (posing compelling hypotheticals of municipal
displays of monuments that offend local families, for example, a Ten Commandments monument
offending local Hindu families, and a university town's statue proclaiming "There is No God,"
offending local Catholic families).
238. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008) (No. 07-665). Here, Pleasant Grove sought to limit its permanent
displays to those relating to its history or donated by groups with long-standing ties. Id. The
latter criterion can be defended on the grounds that community members will both understand the
local culture and values and also be less likely to seek to offend. The Summums had no ties to
Pleasant Grove, so this is not a case of a resident minority religious group suffering from
government discrimination.
239. See supra notes 160-62.
240. See Sekulow & Manion, supra note 235, at 34 n.10 (compiling long list of cases
challenging Ten Commandments displays during the years 1997-2005).
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keep the monument arguably sends a different message: "We're the majority
religion and we have the right to display our symbols, regardless of how
outsiders perceive them." Thus, a finding of government speech in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum-which would indicate judicial acknowledgment of the
city's control over the content of the donated monuments it displays-could
lead to a subsequent Establishment Clause outcome contrary to the holding in
Van Orden.
241
2. Other Potential Limits
Government speech also may be limited by a newer legal argument, that
municipalities are constitutionally prohibited from accepting and displaying
"hate speech" monuments. Two landmark cases have recognized that it is not
a legitimate government function to act based solely on animus toward a
disfavored group. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held unconstitutional a state
statute criminalizing sodomy only between persons of the same sex,242 and in
Romer v. Evans, it struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that
"prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or nudicial action . . . designed to
protect" homosexuals from discrimination.
Granted, as compared with the psychic pain of harmful symbolic speech,
these cases involved more concrete and extreme burdens on disfavored
groups-including imprisonment and exclusion from legal protections,
respectively. Nonetheless, their rationale provides a starting point to
circumscribe similarly motivated government speech. Recently, Steven
Goldberg hypothesized that if a municipality displayed a private organization's
plaque condemning homosexuals on a courthouse wall, based on Lawrence and
Romer, such action could be held unconstitutional.244
241. Whether this type of analysis remains viable in the newly constituted Supreme Court, of
course, is questionable. See Smith, supra note 228, at 94-95 (positing that the new Court may
well reject the endorsement test); see also County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(objecting to "the very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the
objective observer"). Note that Justice Breyer's controlling concurrence in Van Orden used the
endorsement test in fact, but not in name, instead terming the analysis "legal judgment." Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
242. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
243. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
244. Steven Goldberg, Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion to Animus, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 801, 806-07 (2006); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips
Off Our Block? A Reply to Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1282
(2007) (reading Romer and Lawrence as "support[ing] the conclusion that the gratuitous
disparagement of homosexuals is unconstitutional").
Justice Stevens posed a similar hypothetical at oral argument, after hearing the Deputy
Solicitor General's argument that government speech entitles the government to display the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial without risking a requirement to display a Viet Cong memorial,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 22, he asked, "supposing the Government in the
Vietnam Memorial decided not to put up the names of any homosexual soldiers. Would that be
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A related parameter would prohibit racist government speech. James
Forman has best developed this idea in the context of the Confederate flag
cases, grounding it in both the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
and a First Amendment chilling effect argument, 245 but the approach has not
yet been relied on in case law. Much has been written on the multiple
meanings symbolized by Confederate symbols, including monuments.246  It
may take a case of race-based government speech without that particular
history before this limit on the emerging doctrine is adopted by the judiciary.
As well, it may be that any restriction on allegedly racist government speech is
necessarily folded into the broader category of speech that is based solely on
animus toward a disfavored group, and thus outside government's legitimate
function. This is because some defensible core political speech would be
construed by some as racist-the easiest example is a government
administration's speech criticizing affirmative action programs, which is one
side of an ongoing political debate. Monuments, though, have a necessarily
limited role in furthering complex political debates because they "speak" in
broad strokes, rather than expressing sophisticated policy arguments or
providing critical data. Thus, it may be that this proposed limit on racist
government speech can be applied in the monument-decision context.
These potential constitutional restraints on discriminatory government
speech mirror an important policy reason for extending the doctrine to
municipalities' display of privately donated monuments.247 In most, if not all,
cases, governments are motivated, at least by political accountability, to permit
installation of public monuments only where they are respectful of all citizens,
at least as understood by the cultural standards of the day. Holding that
acceptance of any donated park monument automatically creates a public
permissible?" Id. at 23. Counsel responded "yes," then qualified: "as a matter of the Free Speech
Clause, there are no limits. ... Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause,
perhaps the Due Process Clause, there might be thought to be independent checks on the
Government's speech." Id. at 25.
245. James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern
State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 505-06 (199 1) (making the case that racist government speech
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and arguing that NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555
(1 th Cir. 1990), which rejected a claim that display of the Confederate flag on Alabama's state
capitol was unconstitutional, was wrong). See also Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good,
53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 37 (2000) (proposing a ban on racist speech as one clear limit on
government speech).
246. E.g., John M. Coski, The Confederate Battle Flag in Historical Perspective, in
CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH, supra note 115, at 118 ("Even if
historical analysis and argument conclude-as this essay has-that the flag's white supremacist
overtones are inherent and continuing... [t]he nonracist meanings that people attach to the flag
[honoring Confederate soldiers and symbolizing Southern heritage] are real and deserve respect.
[At the same time,] it is naive and logically indefensible [for them to not appreciate that others
see it as a racist symbol.]").
247. Note that this Part does not discuss all potential limits for the new doctrine of
government speech that have been proposed by scholars; rather, it only discusses several that
have particular import for the monument context.
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forum would remove all municipal discretion to create beautiful, welcoming
public green space in America's cities.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The government-speech doctrine is a relatively new and correspondingly
imprecise" development in First Amendment jurisprudence. 248 Thus far, its
emerging reputation has been tainted by uses that fall outside the scope of the
limits proposed by commentators. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases to date
have involved federal funding programs and controversial social issues; thus,
the doctrine has become politicized.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum does little to mitigate that impression. As
addressed at the beginning of this Article, it presents the classic hard case.
Even those in favor of government religious displays may cringe slightly at the
posture of the case; while not the city's intent, it creates the appearance of
249dividing potential donors into sheep and goats.
Careful consideration of the specific context, however, along with the broad
set of detailed, practical examples from the MPEs, show the universal appeal
of repudiating the Tenth Circuit's "public forum-strict scrutiny" approach to
donated monuments in parks. The government speech doctrine is still
developing and its broader implications should continue to be analyzed
thoroughly. Even so, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum presents the next logical
step for recognition of the government speech doctrine, and for express
acknowledgment that forum analysis is not fully equipped to address the
expanding world of expressive public-private partnerships.
248. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (Souter, J., dissenting).
249. See Matthew 25:32-33 (King James) ("And before him shall be gathered all nations,
and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divides his sheep from the goats.").
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APPENDIX
IMLA QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY (OF THE 117 APPLICABLE RESPONSES)
Background Questions:










Any Religious Aspect: 14
Other: 8
(NOTE: many respondents checked several)
* Circumstances of Donation (Question #3a):
Private Donor Initiated (PDI): 71
Multiple Responses Including PDI: 101
Private Donor Responded (PDR) to Municipality's Request (PDR
only): 6
Other: 7 (Other responses clarify that municipalities have privately
donated monument(s))
NR: 1 (same)
(NOTE: many respondents checked several)
(NOTE: NR = "no response"--question left blank)
Questions re: Municipal Content Control
" Monument Accepted or Rejected (Question #3b):
Accepted monument(s): 102
Rejected monument: 3 (1-rejected due to religious nature; 2-gave
no reason)
Accepted some & rejected others: 10 (1-based on neighbor's
objection; 2-based on location; 4-no reason given; 3-rejected
based on content: commemoration of lynching "inciting and not
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necessarily accurate"; anti-homosexual monument "discriminatory";
monument to deceased children "too religious").
NR: 2
m Municipal Decision Makers (Question #4)
Requires Legislative Action: 93
Public or Cultural Department Personnel: 29
Public-Private Committee: 22
Requires Executive Action: 39
Other: 17
(NOTE: many respondents checked several)
m Content-Related Criteria (Questions ##5-6):




Responded that municipality does not use content-related criteria: 41
(NOTE: Appendix D to the IMLA Amicus brief compiled the relevant
responses for 112 municipalities, listed by municipality, and showed
that content control displayed through answers to other questions)
Don't Know: 16
NR: 3
m Control over the Message, Wording or Appearance (Questions ##7-8)
Responded that municipality exercises control over the message,
wording or appearance: 65
Design Input: 43
Prior Submission: 34
Modification of Words: 8
(NOTE: some respondents checked several)
Responded that municipality does not exercise control over message
etc.: 38
(NOTE: Appendix D to the IMLA Amicus brief compiled the relevant
responses for 112 municipalities, listed by municipality, and showed
that content control displayed through answers to other questions)
Don't Know: 11
NR: 3
NOTE: The following are examples where municipalities responded
that they did not control content based on the methods listed in
20081
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Questions ##5-8, but where content control was demonstrated by
requiring legislative acceptance of specifically described
monuments:
Bozeman, Montana (#73) (Ten Commandments
monument); Cibolo, Texas (#138) (statue of former city
manager); Concord, North Carolina (#20) (Peace Pole
donation); Delaware, Ohio (#209) (monument to police
killed in the line of duty); Eagle, Idaho (#204) (Angel
Monument to children who have died); Fargo, North
Dakota (#234) (Ten Commandments monument);
Fayetteville, Arkansas (#211) (peace fountain); Gallup,
New Mexico (#165) (Bataan Death March); Kettering,
Ohio (#185) (monument to lives lost on 9/11); Provo, Utah
(#225) (Ten Commandments monument and war
memorials); Rockford, Illinois (#44) ("Millennium
Fountain"); San Antonio, Texas (#129) (statues of famous
Texans); Sheboygan, Wisconsin (#28) (Hmong-American
Vietnam War Memorial); Spanish Fork, Utah (#188)
(monument to Fathers Dominguez and Escalante/
monument to City's Icelandic population); Swartz Creek,
Michigan (#148) (war memorial); Warner Robins, Georgia
(#133) (historical displays); (#10) (statue of John A.
Roebling).
Questions re: Municipality's Physical Control over Structures
" Municipal Ownership of Monument (Questions ##9-10):
Municipality owns monument(s): 69
Municipality owns some, but not all, monuments(s): 22
Municipality does not own monument(s): 6
NR: 15
Don't know: 5
* Municipality Controls Monument (Question #11):
Right to control monument(s) (e.g., move/remove/dispose): 68
Don't know: 3
NR: 46
(NOTE: based on the wording of Question #11, "NR" may, but does
not necessarily, mean municipality does not have right to control
monument(s))
" Municipality Maintains Monument (Question #12)
Yes: 76
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Questions re: Private Speech Related to Donated Monuments
" Speech Activities Permitted Around the Monument (Questions ## 13-14)
Allowed: 102
Aware of such activities taking place: 69
Not Allowed: 3
NR: 12
" Speech Related to Monument & Occurring Around the Monument
(Question #15)
Aware of such monument-related speech activities around
monument: 32
Not aware of such activities: 67
Don't Know: 1
NR: 17
m Public Opposition to the Existence or Location of Monument (Question
#16):
Opposition to the monument: 24
(Please see summary of Question #3b for following four where
monuments rejected: #26, #28, #30, #67)
Newton, Kansas (#13) (opposition to cost); Moorhead, Minnesota
(#32) (person complained re wording on monument; city met with
person and worked out a compromise); Madison, Wisconsin (#56)
(opposition to monument re gay rights-city proceeded); Eau Claire,
Wisconsin (#59) (ACLU questioned monument with religious
connotation); Idaho Falls, Idaho (#63) (one letter questioning Ten
Commandments monument); Bozeman, Montana (#73) (no details);
Portland, Oregon (#86) (location); Longview, Washington (#92)
(monument questioned re accuracy); Arlington, Texas (#93) (area
churches requested removal of Stonehenge monument); Missoula,
Montana (#98) (veterans group opposed a police monument close to
the veterans monument); Marana, Arizona (#102) (opposition to
unprofessional appearance of public art); Unidentified (#142)
(lawsuits re cross monument); Yuma, Arizona (#166) (complaint re
Ten Commandments monument); Charlottesville, Virginia (#174)
(concerns that interactive First Amendment monument could
encourage vulgarity or inflammatory messages); Troy, Michigan
(#199) (location); Eagle, Idaho (#204) (location); Carlsbad,
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California (#205) (city sued over public artwork display); Ogden,
Utah (#221) (lawsuit re Ten Commandments monument); Pendleton,
Oregon (#227) (complaints re proposed monument, proceeded);
Tucson, Arizona (##232/235/237) (Pancho Villa monument opposed
by some citizens as honoring villain, not hero).
